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Emotions in the Zhuangzi 
The primary purpose of my thesis is to address the lack 
of critical scholarship concerning emotions in classical 
Chinese texts. I do this by examining emotions in three texts: 
the Zhuangzi, the Mencius, and the Xunzi. I use the Zhuangzi 
as my primary text and the others for comparison. 
There are four sections. The first section describes the 
character qing and its use as an "umbrella" term for emotions 
in Warring States texts. 
The second section reveals that there are certain, 
implied, assumptions regarding the nature of emotions shared 
in the Zhuangzi, the Mencius, and the Xunzi. Judgements, 
desires, actions, and physical states are related to emotions 
in these texts. 
The third section examines in detail Zhuangzi's attitude 
toward emotion. It also looks at how his view of emotions 
relates to his concepts of xing, nature, and xin, mind\heart. 
Emotions, he argues, have no place in the natural world, they 
are characteristics of the imperfect, ordinary person rather 
than the natural, perfected one. Emotions are aspects that are 
externally imposed rather than the initial conditions defining 
us at birth. Zhuangzi's view of emotions is also compared to 
Mencius' and Xunzi's view of emotions and to their ideas of 
human nature. Emotions, in Mencius, are innate characteristics 
iii 
that can motivate people to be moral. Emotions, in Xunzi, are 
also innate, but motivate people to behave in a self ish 
manner. 
Finally, the fourth section examines how Zhuangzi 's 
criticism of emotion fits into his philosophical positions. 
These positions suggest that the natural human being has no 
individuality. The final discussion examines the question of 
whether or not such a position is tenable. 
iv 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
In Western thought, when we discuss the concept of self 
we include the emotions. Although we often view emotions as 
irrational and as something to be controlled, we nevertheless 
see them as necessary to one's personality. Words like 
sadness, happiness, joy, and so on are used to describe our 
inner self, our 
contrast to this 
thoughts, values and goals. In 
is Zhuangzi 's concept of the 
complete 
self. The 
natural human being, he says, is one who has no emotion. The 
questions, then, that I will endeavour to answer are: what is 
Zhuangz i 's attitude toward emotions and what does this suggest 
about his concept of self. 
In order to arrive at a complete picture of Zhuangzi's 
view of emotions, I will begin by trying to determine what he 
means by emotions. A large part of my thesis will focus on how 
emotions are portrayed in the Zhuangzi, and how they correlate 
with other concepts such as human nature and the mind-heart. 
In order to highlight Zhuangzi's atypical viewpoint in 
relation to other Warring States philosophers, I will compare 
it with those in the Mencius and the Xunzi. I will then follow 
up Zhuangzi's view of emotions with a discussion of whether or 
not this view is reasonable. 
It is possible to see how emotions are portrayed in the 
Zhuangzi by looking at passages where emotions, like joy and 
grief, are addressed. This can be enhanced by examining how 
the character qing, emotions, is used. 
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Throughout the Mencius, the Zhuangzi, and the Xunzi, qing 
is found in many passages that deal with emotions. Qing, I 
find, is used as an "umbrella" term for a variety of emotions 
like sadness, compassion, joy, and anger. Therefore, any 
description of how emotions are portrayed in these Warring 
States texts needs to include passages that talk about 
particular emotions and passages where qing is used. 
By looking at passages where qing and emotions are 
addressed two things become apparent: while Zhuangzi, Mencius, 
and Xunzi have similar views regarding what an emotion is, 
their attitudes toward emotions and the way they perceive 
emotions in relation to human beings varies considerably. The 
Zhuangzi, the Mencius, and the Xunzi understand emotions to 
include desires, evaluations, behaviour and physical 
expressions; these features, however, are often implicit 
assumptions embedded in other discussions. Although Zhuangzi, 
Mencius, and Xunzi have coinciding views regarding what is 
involved in emotions, Zhuangzi, nevertheless, talks about 
emotions as the source of one's entanglement in an artificial 
world; the ideal person is depicted as one who is unaffected 
by emotions. In the Mencius, emotions are portrayed as a 
source of morality and they are seen as innate qualities in 
all human beings. Emotions, in the Xunzi, are also innate, 
but they are seen as dangerous and irrational. They are 
characteristic of the sage, who through the rites and music, 
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tempers them to achieve proper expression. Emotions, in 
Confucian texts, are constituents of both the average person 
and the sage; in the Zhuangzi, they are part of the make-up of 
the ordinary or artificial person, but not of the ideal person 
who is, at the same time, the truly natural human being. 
Is a person who has lacks emotion someone we would 
consider truly human? Is Zhuangzi 's concept of the sage 
possible? Why would he develop this seemingly absurd idea? In 
order to answer these questions we have to look at Zhuangzi's 
concept of a self from three perspectives: within his system, 
outside his system, and why he says what he does. We will see 
that the idea of a person who is unaffected by emotion fits in 
quite well with Zhuangzi's overall philosophy. Human nature 
and the mind in their natural states are plain and unadorned; 
the individual, who returns to his natural state of being, is 
portrayed as objective and unaffected by his environment. Yet, 
when we speak of human beings as unemotional we tend to view 
them as less than human. Both Mencius and Xunzi, for example, 
say that to have emotions is to be human. However, because 
emotions include judgements, desires, and actions, all these 
things, according to Zhuangzi, lead to ego-action; this in 
turn creates disorder and chaos. The Daoist sage is not 
dependant on emotion to tell her how she should respond to a 
situation, she does so simply by inaction, wu-wei. 
There are very few secondary sources that directly 
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discuss the issue of emotions in classical Chinese thought. 
One of the few articles is David Wong's "Is There a 
Distinction Between Reason and Emotions in Mencius?" Wong 
describes the four innate tendencies in human nature as the 
"primitive beginnings of an emotion. " 1 He argues that emotions 
such as compassion are both affective and cognitive: they are 
cognitive in that they identify the salient features that 
compel one to action. He writes: 
... not only does the emotion of compassion help 
solve the frame problem through influence on 
salience, but the relevant salient features are 
identified as a reason to act in ways 
characteristic of the compassionate person. 2 
For example, in Mencius' anecdote of the child who almost fell 
in the well, the possible suffering of the child is depicted 
as the object of compassion, as a reason to act in a helping 
way. Emotions in Mencius, according to Wong, involve rational 
thought. In a response to this article, Craig Ihara argues 
Wong's proposal might be better applied to a subset of moral 
emotions because other emotions, such as envy, are often 
irrational and do not justify reasons for action. 
Virtually nothing has been written on emotions in the 
Zhuangzi. One exception is the discussion on emotions in Wu 
1 David B. Wong, "Is There a Distinction Between Emotion 
and Reason in Mencius? Philosophy East and West 41.1 (1991), 
p. 31. 
2 Ibid. I p. 3 6. 
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Kuang-ming's Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher a~ Play. Here, he 
discusses emotion in relation to the concept of non-being. Wu 
says that non-being is embodied in human beings. The perfect 
person is one who has become non-being, that is non-feeling, 
non-knowing, non-worrying and so forth. Emotions must be 
fasted off: one must be free of the sway of feeling and 
passions to achieve inner unity. Emotions like happiness are 
described as somewhere in between being and non-being. 
Happiness is just such a unity between what cannot-
-be--helped and what one-cannot-help-but-be. And 
one somehow knows it when one comes to that 
situation--where one is disturbed neither by sorrow 
nor by joy, but is just as one is, in sorrow or in 
joy.3 
Emotions, says Wu, may exist but they should not be allowed to 
affect one's tranquillity. Emotions are secondary in Wu's view 
and are only used to explain the full significance of what is 
meant by non-being. 
Although very little has been written about emotions in 
classical Chinese thought there are texts and articles that 
have been written about xing, human nature, and xin, mind-
heart, in both Daoist and Confucian texts. Donald Munro, in 
his Concep~ of Man in Early China, for example, examines the 
etymology of the characters xing and xin. He argues that the 
meaning of xing, in Warring States texts, is dependant on xin. 
3 Wu Kuang-ming, Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher a~ Play, 
(New York: Crossroads, 1982), p. 69. 
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The function of the mind-heart, he says, is to guide one's 
innate social tendencies. Roger Ames and A. C. Graham argue 
that human nature, in Mencius and Xunzi, is dynamic. This 
concept of xing differs from many traditional translations and 
definitions of it. Xing is not just what is innate or what is 
a priori, it is also open to change that is ultimately 
beneficial to the person and society. In Ames' words "it is 
the embodiment of personal development."4 Lee Yearly, in his 
"The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang Tzu," shows how 
the mind of the perfect person is impartial like the Dao by 
drawing on symbols of the hinge and mirror. Unfortunately, 
many of the articles on Daoism tend to focus on how the 
perfected person is like the Dao. However, these articles are 
helpful because they examine how terms like xing are 
interpreted in the primary texts we are concerned with. 
Understanding how xing and xin are employed in various texts 
helps one to account for the different views of emotion in the 
Mencius, Xunzi and the Zhuangzi. 
A little has been written on the etymology of qing. A. C. 
Graham and Donald Munro discuss it briefly in footnotes. Both 
agree that qing refers to "what something is really like." 
Graham, in "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human 
4 Roger T. Ames, "The Mencian Concept of Ren Xing: Does 
it Mean 'Human Nature'?" in Henry Rosemont, Jr. , ed. , Chinese 
Text and Philosophical Contexts (Illinois, Open Court), p. 
152. 
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Nature," also argues that it never means "passions" in pre-Han 
texts. 5 Xu Fuguan, in his History of Chinese Theories of Human 
Nature, addresses the meaning of qing in the Zhuangzi. He says 
it may have the same meaning as xing or that it may refer to 
the emotions. 6 The etymology and use of qing is important 
because qing often means "emotions." 
Although there has been little written about emotion in 
classical Chinese thought, there are many Western philosophers 
who discuss the nature of emotion. Generally, they discuss 
what an emotion is. Some scholars, such as Robert Solomon and 
Stephen Leighton, argue that judgements are necessary in order 
for an emotion to be evoked. Others, such as Jenefer Robinson, 
argue that desires are essential and cause particular 
judgements. Other writers, such as Catherine Lutz, look at the 
meaning and value of emotion in culture. Lutz, in her 
Unnatural Emotions, shows how emotion plays a central role in 
our view of the world. Words like "envy" and "fear" are used 
to speak about the self, about the private and ineffable, they 
also are used to talk about the irrational, the uncontrollable 
and the vulnerable. Emotions, she argues, encompass two 
5 A. c. Graham, "The background of the Mencian Theory of 
Human Nature," in studies in Chinese Philosophy and 
Philosophical Literature (Singapore: Institute of East 
Asian Philosophies, 1986). 
6 Xu Fuguan, Zhungguo Ren Xing Lun Shi (A History of 
Chinese Theories of Human Nature) (Taipei: Commercial 
Press, 1969). 
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contradictory ideas, they are viewed as opposing the 
positively evaluated process of thought and opposing the 
negatively evaluated estrangement from the world. 7 Because 
they are crucial in the definition of interpersonal relations, 
they are seen as a product of social life. By comparing these 
theories of emotion with classical Chinese texts we can ask 
questions about whether or not emotions are contrasted with 
reason and if they are viewed as belonging to the domain of 
the self. 
The Zhuangzi will be the primary text used for this 
project. Although the Inner Chapters (Chapters One to Seven) 
are considered by most scholars to be the work of Zhuangzi, I 
will use the entire text for my research. I am interested in 
what the entire text says about emotions. It is not just the 
work of the author of the Inner Chapters that is of concern, 
but Daoist thought in general from the fourth to the second 
centuries B. c. E. as it is reflected in the entire text. The 
Dao De Jing and the Liezi will be used to illustrate further 
Daoist thought concerning the emotions. I will not deal with 
emotions in these texts individually; since they interpret 
emotions in much the same way as the Zhuangzi, but I will use 
some passages from these texts to supplement the material in 
7 Catherine Lutz, Unnatural Emotion: Everyday Sentiments 
on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p.3. 
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the Zhuangzi. As well, roughly contemporary texts, such as the 
Mencius and the Xunzi will be used to show how Zhuangzi's view 
of emotions differs from the prevalent thought of the time. 
A great deal of my thesis will be descriptive because I 
will draw largely from the primary texts cited to portray how 
emotions were conceived by the author. This is necessary since 
very little scholarship has focused on the role of emotions in 
these texts. This will include some etymological research on 
the term qing and a comparison of the perception and 
interpretation of this term. 
The final section of my thesis is largely philosophical. 
Having shown that emotions are not part of the natural human 
being in the Zhuangzi, I am interested in examining the logic 
of Zhuangzi 's thought. What notions underlie his view of 
emotions? Is the idea of an individual who has no emotion a 
reasonable concept or simply an impossible goal? 
Discussions concerning emotions have taken place in the 
West and East for the past 2,000 years, yet there is almost a 
total absence of critical evaluation of how emotions have been 
perceived in Chinese philosophy. As I have shown above, 
emotion has never been fully discussed by either traditional 
or modern scholarship. In fact, modern scholars have generally 
taken the Daoist sage at face value. For this reason alone 
examining the concept of emotions in Chinese philosophy is a 
useful project. Why study emotions? Because Chinese 
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philosophy, like many Western philosophies, ask questions 
concerning human nature and how one should live, any answer to 
these questions must in some way involve emotion. Thus, by 
examining what emotions are and what place they have in the 
"good life," in Chinese philosophical texts, the reader is 
provided with a better understanding of Zhuangzi's view of the 
ideal human being. 
Chapter Two: Qinq as an "Umbrella" Term For Emotions 
There is no clearly set out argument about emotions in 
the Zhuangzi. It is only by looking at what Zhuangzi says 
about things like happiness, sadness, grief, and so on, that 
we can infer his views. When Zhuangzi, for example, equates 
being unaffected by joy and grief as "being free from the 
bonds of God, " 8 we can see that he perceives emotion as 
shackles and the cause of unnecessary suffering. Yet, when we 
look at the passages where emotion words are used, we often 
find that qing is used. It seems to be used as an "umbrella" 
term for a wide range of emotions. Oddly, this is not 
reflected in English translations of Chinese texts from the 
Warring States period or in Western scholarship dealing with 
these texts. Graham, for example, argues that qing refers to 
what is "essential" and "genuine" in human beings while other 
translators, such as Watson and Munro, remark that it can have 
other meanings such as "truth" and "sentiments." If we examine 
passages where qing is used it will become obvious that it has 
several meanings, yet we will see that it is often used as a 
general term for emotions. 
In Warring States texts, the question of what role 
emotions played in the make-up of human beings was secondary 
to questions of whether or not human nature was good, neutral, 
or bad. Many passages, therefore, that specifically discuss 
8 Burton Watson, The Comple~e Works of Chuang Tzu (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 53. 
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qing and its relation to things like joy, anger and grief are 
obscure. There are, nevertheless, a few obvious examples where 
qing is used as a broad term that includes various emotions. 
A later text, the Li Ji says: 
What are human qing? Liking, hatred, joy, anger, 
sadness, fear, love, evil, and desire, these seven 
are natural capacities and they are not learned. 9 
Here, emotions like joy, anger, love, hate, as well as things 
like evil and desire are grouped together to define the term 
qing. A similar passage, where things like anger are 
classified as qing, can be found in the Xunzi. 
The xing's liking, hatred, joy, anger, sadness and 
delight are called qing. 10 
Emotions like hatred, joy, anger, sadness and delight, which 
are part of our nature, xing, are grouped together under the 
term qing. Qing, ·in both the Li Ji and the Xunzi, is defined 
by a wide range of emotions. Qing often seems to be used in 
much the same way as the English word "emotion" because, like 
emotion, it is used as a general term that includes different 
emotions like happiness and joy. 
Although qing can be used as an "umbrella" term for a 
9 Li Ji, "Li Yun," cf. James Legge, trans., Li Ki: Book 
of Rites, Vol. 27-28 of The Sacred Books of the East (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1885; repr., New York: University 
Books, 1967) Vol.1, p. 379. 
10 Xunzi, "Rectifying Names," cf. Burton Watson, trans. , 
Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1963)' p. 139. 
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variety of emotions in the Xunzi and the Li Ji, what it means 
and how it was used may vary from text to text. In order to 
understand the facets of qing we must examine how it was used 
in Warring States texts especially in the Mencius, the 
Zhuangzi and the Xunzi. 11 
Many scholars recognize that qing has several meanings. 
Many, nevertheless, stress that it primarily refers to "the 
nature of a thing." Munro argues that qing is often used to 
mean "reality" or "real nature. " 12 Qing, he says, describes 
"what something is really like" or "the way something is," 
yet, it differs from xing, nature, in that it is static. Qing 
is what you are born with, whereas xing, according to Munro, 
is dynamic because it can be moulded by one's environment. 13 
11 There are no records of qing in the oracle bones, from 
the Shang or in the early Zhou graphs. We first see qing used 
in Warring States texts such as the Mencius and the Zhuangzi. 
While the dates for the authorship of these texts remains 
disputed, most authorities agree that the Mencius was written 
around 372-289 B.C. E., the Xunzi ca. 300 B.C.E., and the 
Zhuangzi between 400 B.C.E. and 200 A.C. 
12 From the Mencius, Munro cites the following passages to 
illustrate the use of qing as "nature:" "Can this be the hsing 
[xing] of the mountain?" and "Can this be the ch' ing [qing] of 
man?" Mencius 4.A.8.1. From the Xunzi, he cites the following 
passage: "Therefore, if a person neglects what men can do and 
seeks what Heaven does, he fails to understand the nature 
(ch'ing) [qing]." Dubs, Hsun Tzu, p.183. From the Zhuangzi, 
Munro quotes: "Life and death are by decree ... men cannot do 
anything about them. Without exception this is the ch 'ing 
[qing] of things." Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Early 
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 212-
213. 
13 Ib'd 213 ~ . ' p. . 
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Qing, he says, can also mean "true" and that 11 it can also 
carry the sense of sentiments, of something relevant to the 
constitution of man. n14 Watson, like Munro, in his 
translations of the Zhuangzi and the Xunzi, translates qing in 
relation to "what something is really like;" he uses words or 
phrases such as "original nature, 11 11 identity, 11 and "true state 
of affairs." He also translates qing as "emotion" or 
"feeling:" 
... though something may alarm the house [his spirit lives 
in], his emotions [qing] will suffer no death. 15 
He is born with feelings [qing] of envy and hate, 
and if he indulges in these they will lead him into 
violence and crime. 16 
Munro and Watson translate qing as "nature," "real," "true," 
"emotions" and "sentiments." Nature, real, and true are 
approximate synonyms. Each of these words tell us what 
something is really like. Similarly, emotions, sentiments, and 
feeling are roughly synonymous, each being characterized by 
things like sadness, love and hate. Qing, then, has two basic 
uses: it is used to describe the nature of a thing and it is 
14 Using a passage from the Zhuangzi, Munro suggests that 
qing may mean "true." "He has a temporary abode but no true 
(ch'ing) [qing] death." Using the Analects, he shows that it 
can also refer to "sentiments, 11 11 (I] f the superior loves 
trustworthiness, the people won't dare hide their true 
feelings (ch'ing) [qing]." Analects xiii.4.3. Ibid., p.213. 
15 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 88. 
16 Watson, Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings, p. 157. 
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a term used to group together emotions like happiness and 
grief. 
Qing has two principal meanings: nature and emotion. 
This, according to Xu Fuguan, can also be found in the 
Zhuangzi. Qing, he says, does not have one independent 
meaning. It may have the same meaning as xing, nature, or it 
may refer to emotions, particularly emotions that are caused 
by des ires. 17 Graham argues, however, that in pre-Han texts 
qing almost never means "passions, " 18 even in the Xunzi. In 
Chinese philosophy it is used to describe things, "the qing of 
X is what is genuinely X in it. " 19 What is genuine in X is 
often contrasted with xing, shape, or mao, guise. Qing, 
according to Graham, describes what is essential to a thing, 
it means what is necessary to human beings. Qing, he says, is 
equivalent to the Aristotelian "essence. " 20 The definition of 
17 Xu Fuguan, Zhungguo Ren Xing Lun Shi , p. 3 7 0. 
18 Passions are frequently synonymous with emotions since 
they are defined by strong feelings like love and hate. 
19 Graham, using a passage from the Zhuangzi, argues that 
qing refers to what is essential in a thing. "By what is the 
Tao hidden that there can be genuine or false? It can be 
credited with ch' ing [qing} ( 'what it essentially is') . " 
Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human 
Nature," pp. 59-60. 
20 That qing means "essence" can be seen in definitions 
and quasi-definitions. "To fit in with all within and without 
and above and below is the essence ( qing] of duty." Xunzi 
chapter 16. "May I ask what you mean by benevolence and duty? 
Confucius said: To delight in your innermost heart in loving 
everyone impartially is the essence [qing] of benevolence and 
16 
qing as "essence" is slightly different in the Xunzi and the 
Li Ji. "Here, ch'ing [qing] is the genuine and unassumed, in 
contrast with mao "guise and demeanour" which is wen 
"patterned, refined" in obedience to rites. In these texts but 
nowhere else in pre-Han literature, the word refers only to 
the genuine in man. "21 As well, in his translations of the 
Zhuangzi, Graham translates qing as "essence," "true" or 
"identity" but never as emotion or any synonym of it. 
However, when we examine passages where emotional states 
and words such as "happy" and "sad" are used, we can see that 
the character qing is used there as a general term for a 
variety of emotions. Munro, using a passage from the Analects, 
illustrates this. 
If a superior loves trustworthiness, the people 
won't dare hide their true feelings (ch'ing) 
[ qing] . 22 
If a superior can express his love for something like 
duty. Zhuangzi, chapter 13, quoted, ibid., pp. 60-61. 
21 Graham uses passages from the Xunzi and the Li Ji to 
illustrate that qing refers to the "genuine." From the Xunzi: 
"The refined and ordered and the genuine [qing] and the 
useful, becoming each other's exterior and interior, 
proceeding together in conjunction, this is the midstream of 
the rites." Xunzi, chapter 16. From the Li Ji: What is meant 
by "the genuine in man" [qing]? Pleasure, anger, sadness, 
fear, love, hate, desire, these are the seven we are capable 
of without having learned them. Li Ji, chapter 9, quoted, 
Ibid. , p. 64. 
22 Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, p. 213, 
citing the Analects xiii.4.3. 
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trustworthiness then the people will follow his example and 
express their feelings for this virtue as well. 
In the Mencius, qing is defined by the four virtues: ren, 
yi, li, and zhi. Ren, which Mencius says is the goal for all 
human beings, involves love for one's kin and love for 
humanity. If qing is partly made up of ren, then, it follows 
that qing has an emotional content. Furthermore, the four 
beginnings of the four virtues are emotions, or at least the 
beginnings of emotion. 
"As for what is genuinely good [ qing] in him is 
concerned, a man is capable of becoming good," said 
Mencius. "That is what I mean by good .... The heart 
[xin] of compassion is possessed by all men alike; 
likewise the heart of shame, the heart of respect, 
the heart of right and wrong. The heart of 
compassion pertains to benevolence [ren], the heart 
of shame to dutifulness [yi], the heart of respect 
to the observance of the rites [li], and the heart 
of right and wrong to wisdom [zhi]. Benevolence, 
dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom 
are not welded on to me from the outside; they are 
in me originally."n 
The four beginnings relate to our innate sensitivity to 
others. As Wong argues, it makes sense to classify innate 
sensitivity, such as compassion, as emotion. 24 If the four 
virtues are based in emotional states, then it seems 
straightforward to say that qing is used, in this passage, as 
23 D. c. Lau, trans., Mencius (London: Penguin Books, 
1970), p. 163. 
24 Wong, "Is There a Distinction Between Reason and 
Emotion in Mencius," p. 31. 
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a "umbrella" term for emotions. The four virtues are based in 
human emotions. 
However, Mencius also uses qing to mean "nature. 1125 
Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom may refer to 
the "genuine" in us. Qing translated as "emotions" does not 
readily account for qualities like wisdom and righteousness; 
we do not normally associate them with emotion. The term 
"nature," on the other hand, can account for all these 
qualities; those that are easily identifiable as emotions and 
those that are not. Nevertheless, whatever qing refers to here 
it obviously has strong emotional overtones. If it is 
"nature," then, we can argue that emotions like compassion and 
love are part of our nature. No matter how qing is translated, 
emotions, such as love and compassion are part of it in the 
Mencius. 
Qing, in the Zhuangzi, has two basic meanings: "nature" 
and "emotions." Qing seems to refer to "nature" when it is 
used in a positive way. In passages where one is exhorted to 
regain one's original qing it means "nature." The Zhuangzi 
says: 
The Way was pulled apart for the sake of goodness; 
Virtue was imperiled for the sake of conduct. After 
this, inborn nature [xing] was abandoned and minds 
were set free to roam, mind joining with mind in 
understanding; there was knowledge, but it could 
25 
"That things are unequal is their nature (qing)." See 
Lau, Mencius, p. 104. 
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not bring stability to the world. After this, 
"culture" was added on, and "breadth" was piled on 
top. "Culture" destroyed the substantial, "breadth" 
drowned the mind, and after this the people began 
to be confused and disordered. They had no way to 
revert to the true form of their inborn nature 
[ q ing] or return once more to the Beg inning. 26 
Qing here refers to what one was born with, it is the optimum 
state that has been lost due to things like understanding and 
culture. This type of phrase--the true form of their inborn 
nature--occurs throughout the Zhuangzi and it corresponds to 
passages that talk about xing. Even in this passage xing is 
said to be lost with the advent of goodness and conduct. The 
inborn nature is the ideal state for human beings. It is only 
in uncarved simplicity, according to Zhuangzi, that people 
attain their true nature. 27 When qing is referred to in a 
positive manner in the Zhuangzi, as a state that has been lost 
due to negative influences or as a state one should regain, 
then, it has the meaning of xing, nature. 
In a few passages in the Inner Chapters, qing is spoken 
of in a negative manner and it is in these passages that it 
seems to refer to "emotion." This can be seen in a discussion 
between Huizi and Zhuangzi. 
Hui Tzu (Huizi] said to Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi], "Can 
a man really be without feelings [qing] ?" 
Chuang Tzu: "Yes." 
Hui Tzu: "But a man who has no feelings [qing]--how 
26 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, pp. 172-3. 
27 Ibid., p. 105. 
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can you call him a man?" 
Chuang Tzu: "The Way gave him a face; Heaven gave 
him a form--why can't you call him a man?" 
Hui Tzu: "But if you've already called him a man, 
how can he be without feelings [qing]. 
Chuang Tzu: "That's not what I mean by feelings. 
When I talk about having no feeling [qing], I mean 
that a man doesn't allow likes or dislikes to get 
in and do him harm. He just lets things be the way 
they are and doesn't try to help life along." 
Hui Tzu: "If he doesn't try to help life along, 
then how will he keep himself alive?" 
Chuang Tzu: "The Way gave him a face; Heaven gave 
him a form. He doesn't let likes or dislikes get in 
and do him harm. You, now--you treat your spirit 
like an outsider. You wear out your energy, leaning 
on a tree and moaning, slumping at your desk and 
dozing--Heaven picked out a body for you and you 
use it to gibber about "hard" and "white. " 28 
Zhuangzi claims that feelings are not necessary to human 
beings. This is not inconsistent with other passages that 
discuss emotions such as happiness and sadness. Emotions, in 
Zhuangz i 's thought, are portrayed as important elements in the 
destruction of the original mind and nature of human beings. 
He claims they are like weeds and rushes choking what is 
useful and fitting for us. 29 Qing here does not mean "nature" 
or "essence" as Graham argues because Zhuangzi, in this 
passage, says human beings have a form, a face, as well as a 
spirit; all these things make up human beings. Zhuangzi, in 
this passage, is claiming that qing is not necessary to human 
beings; it, therefore, cannot mean "nature" because it is our 
28 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
29 Ibid., pp. 286-287. 
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nature or essence that Zhuangzi is continually exhorting us to 
attain or regain. 
Interestingly, qing is often used in passages where 
emotions are the topic of discussion, even in passages where 
qing refers to "what something is really like." A passage in 
the Zhuangzi where Watson and Graham translate qing as 
"identity," refers to several emotions that are part of the 
true person. 
Joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret, 
fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, wilfulness, 
candour, insolence--music from empty holes, 
mushrooms springing up in dampness, day and night 
replacing each other before us, and no one knows 
where they sprout from. Let it be! Let it be! [It 
is enough that] morning and evening we have them, 
and they are a means by which we live. Without them 
we would not exist; without us they would have 
nothing to take hold of. This comes close to the 
matter. But I do not know what makes them the way 
they are. It would seem as though they have some 
True Master, and yet I find no trace of him. He can 
act--that is certain. Yet I cannot see his form. He 
has identity [qing] but no form. 30 
Grief, anger, and music are aspects that make things what they 
are and they are necessary to human beings. What is necessary 
to the true man is qing. Qing, then, in this passage, depicts 
those characteristics necessary for life and these 
characteristics include joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, and 
30 Ibid., p.37-38. The quotes from the Zhuangzi that 
discuss the translations of the character qing are taken from 
the "Inner Chapters." This section of the Zhuangzi is 
considered by many scholars to have been written during the 
Warring States period. The remaining text is thought to be 
later additions. 
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regret. Whether or not qing is translated as identity or 
emotion, feelings, like anger, make up its definition. 31 
As we have seen, Graham defines qing as "essence" in the 
Zhuangzi, and as "genuine" in the Xunzi. He does not explain 
why these particular words are appropriate translations or 
even how he arrived at these conclusions. Watson and Munro 
unfortunately do the same. Graham and the others merelY 
provide a passage and replace "essence" for the character 
qing. He does say that this is the obvious meaning since qing 
is contrasted with "shape" and "guise," in Zhuangzi, and with 
"refined," in Xunzi. Why "emotion" cannot be contrasted with 
"shape" or "refined" is not obvious. This position leads to 
some odd translations: from the Xunzi, Graham translates the 
following, 
our nature's [xing] liking and disliking, pleasure 
and anger, sadness and joy, is called "the genuine 
inus" [qing]. 32 
Whatever translation is supplied for qing it is obviously a 
general term for emotions because words like pleasure, anger, 
31 The Zhuangzi, on the whole, has a negative attitude 
toward emotions. This will become evident later when I discuss 
his attitude toward emotions and the role they play in the 
individual. This passage, which suggests emotions are part of 
the make-up of the true man, conflicts with Zhuangzi's thought 
regarding emotion. The point here was to illustrate the 
relationship between the character qing and emotions like joY 
and anger. 
32 Graham, "The Mencian Theory of Human Nature" p. 65' 
citing the Xunzi, chapter 24. 
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sadness and joy are grouped together under it. Whether qing 
refers to "the genuine" or the "emotions," words like pleasure 
and anger are necessary components of it, and are regarded as 
innate qualities in human beings. Graham seems to be ignoring 
the importance of emotions in this passage. Why he translates 
qing as "the genuine in us" is not evident; that it is 
essential to human beings is already obvious since these 
characteristics are said to be part of our inborn nature. 
Thus, his translation of qing in this passage as "the genuine 
in us" is redundant. If we must translate qing would not 
"emotion" be a better translation since it is a general term 
that encompasses different feelings like anger and love? 
Furthermore, when Xunzi refers to human nature he often 
contrasts the refined nature of the sage to one's genuine or 
emotional nature, yet, what is refined in the sage is the 
expression of joy, anger, liking, and disliking. In actuality, 
then, what distinguishes the nature of the sage from the 
nature of the uncultured individual is the way in which 
emotions are expressed. Does it not follow then, that when 
Xunzi is talking about the original, unrefined nature of human 
beings he is talking about their emotional nature? 
Qing in Warring States texts is often used as a general 
term for emotion. This is most clearly seen in the Xunzi and 
the Li Ji which were written toward the end of the Warring 
states period and beyond. In these texts words like hatred, 
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joy, delight, anger, and fear were termed qing. In the Mencius 
and the Zhuangzi, which were written earlier, qing was not as 
neatly defined. In the Mencius, for example, emotions like 
compassion and benevolence were defined under qing, but so 
were other things like righteousness and wisdom. In the 
Zhuangzi, qing is used in passages where emotions and 
emotional states are discussed. As well, in passages where 
qing is spoken of in a negative way, qing refers to emotions 
like happiness because qing, like these feelings, is seen as 
not necessary to human beings. Qing, then, in pre-Han texts, 
quite often refers to emotions, but it has yet to become 
clearly defined. 
The use of the term qing in Warring States literature, 
can tell the reader a great deal about how emotions were 
perceived and understood in the Zhuangzi as well as in the 
Confucian texts the Mencius and Xunzi. 
Chapter Three: What an Emotion is 
in Classical· Chinese Thouqht 
While there is very little discussion about emotion by 
commentators on Chinese philosophy, there has been some 
discussion in the West. Western philosophers have debated the 
characteristics of emotions and what is necessary for an 
emotion. Stephen Leighton argues that emotions always consist 
of judgements and feelings. Other characteristics that may be 
present, but are not essential, are desire and behaviour.n 
Robert Solomon says that judgements are the foundation of 
emotion and all other characteristics, such as desire and 
physical responses, are tied to them.~ Jenefer Robinson, on 
the other hand, maintains that emotions are composed of 
judgements that are caused by desire. 35 Common to all the 
works that discuss the nature of emotion are four basic 
features: judgement, action, desire and physiological 
responses. 
If we examine passages on emotions in Warring States 
texts it becomes apparent that these four basic features are 
also considered to be components of emotion in classical 
Chinese philosophy. There is a definite relationship between 
33 Stephen Leighton, "Modern Theories of Emotion," The 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2.3 (1988), p. 221. 
~ Robert C. Solomon. "On Emotions as Judgments," American 
Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1988), p. 184. 
35 Jenefer Robinson, "Emotion, Judgment, and Desire," 
Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983), p. 737. 
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emotion and judgement. A judgement often includes evaluations, 
beliefs, thought, suppositions and so forth. Judgement seems 
to be related to emotion in the Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi, for 
example, asks: 
How do I know that in hating death I am not like a 
man who, having left home in his youth, and not 
forgotten the way back. 36 
Zhuangzi is questioning the logic of humanity's response to 
death. Why do we hate it? Our judgement of death as something 
dangerous and detrimental to our well being makes us hate it. 
We learn to hate death because we learn to see it as the end 
of the self; we fail to realize, according to Zhuangzi, that 
we have no evidence to support this assumption. This 
evaluation of death seems essential for the emotion of hate. 
Stephen Leighton says "judgements seem necessary to 
account for the object directness of emotion. " 37 Obviously, in 
order for hate to exist we must believe that death will mean 
the end of our selves. If we did not have these thoughts about 
death we would neither fear nor hate it. That a judgement 
about something is necessary in order for there to be an 
emotion toward it can be seen in the following passage from 
the Zhuangzi, 
Confucius said, "I once went on a mission to Ch'u, 
36 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 4 7. 
37 Stephen R. Leighton, "Modern Theories of Emotion," p. 
208. 
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and as I was going along, I saw some little pigs 
nursing at the body of their dead mother. After a 
while, they gave a start and all ran away and left 
her; she was not the same as she had been before. 
In loving their mother, they loved not her body but 
the thing that moved her body. When a man has been 
killed in battle and people come to bury him, he 
has no use for medals. When a man has his feet 
amputated, he doesn't care much about shoes. For 
both, the thing that is basic no longer exists."~ 
The little pigs loved their living mother. They loved her 
because they judged her care-giving to be good and beneficial 
to their well-being. Their love was based on what was basic to 
her. In other words, the little pigs valued whatever it was 
that allowed their mother to nurse them. In order for their 
love to exist what caused this love must also exist. The 
mother's life force was the object to which the piglets• love 
was directed: it is because they believed this to be good that 
they loved her. 
Emotions also involve evaluations in the Mencius. During 
his visit with King Xuan of Qi, Mencius tries to show King 
Xuan that he can bring peace to the people because he has a 
heart of compassion. Mencius says he heard the following of 
the king: 
The King was sitting in the upper part of the hall 
and someone lead an ox to the lower part. The King 
noticed this and said, "Where is the ox going?" 
"The blood of the ox is to be used for consecrating 
a new bell." "Spare it. I cannot bear to see it 
shrinking with fear, like an innocent man going to 
38 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 73. 
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the place of execution."H 
Mencius objective here is to point out to the king that his 
compassion for the ox's suffering led to his subsequent action 
of cancelling its execution. The king had compassion for the 
ox because he perceived it to be "shrinking with fear." If the 
king did not make this judgement about the ox it would be 
illogical for him to have compassion. 
Judgements, then, in the Mencius and Zhuangzi, are 
necessary for responding to something with emotion. Judgements 
also help account for different emotions such as love and 
hate. We love what we judge to be good or beneficial, but hate 
what we believe to be unwholesome or terrifying. As Leighton 
says: "[W]hy a certain state is described as fear rather than 
excitement, anger or shame is plausibly explained by 
differences in the evaluations constitutive of those 
emotions. " 40 
Judgements are not characteristic of emotions in Xunzi's 
philosophy. He claims that emotions are both instinctive and 
spontaneous: "[I]t is a man's emotional nature to love profit 
and desire gain."~ If emotions are innate, then, they cannot 
be a response to a judgement that something is desirable or 
39 Lau, Mencius, pp. 54-55. 
40 Leighton, "Modern Theories of Emotion," p. 207. 
41 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p. 161. 
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worthy of seeking. The idea that emotions are products of our 
nature can be seen in the following passage from the Xunzi. 
Phenomena such as the eye's fondness for beautiful 
forms, the ear's fondness for beautiful sounds, the 
mouth's fondness for delicious flavors, the mind's 
fondness for profit, or the body's fondness for 
pleasure and ease--these are all products of the 
emotional nature of man. 42 
Human beings are born with a fondness for what is pleasing and 
favourable. Feelings, like pleasure, are naturally expressed, 
we do not need to judge something as good and worthy of our 
attention for them to arise. Where Zhuangzi and Mencius speak 
of judgements as stimuli for emotion, Xunzi talks about 
emotions as inherent qualities that spontaneously occur. 
Is Xunzi 's position plausible? For example, when do 
emotions spontaneously arise? Why does anger occur in one 
instance and grief in another? If judgement is unnecessary to 
the presence of emotion how can we account for different 
emotions such as joy, anger, and fear? If Xunzi argues that 
emotions are inherent responses, then, the object of emotions 
self-satisfaction must also be innate. In other words, if 
feelings, like fondness, are innate, then, knowledge of what 
is deserving of fondness must also be innate. We must first 
understand that something is beautiful before a fondness for 
it can exist. Are we born making these kind of judgements? Are 
judgements, for Xunzi, instinctive/inherent judgements? Xunzi 
42 b 'd I~., pp. 160. 
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may claim that emotions are instinctive and inherent responses 
but can he realistically deny that judgement is necessary for 
emotion? 
For others, judgements and emotion are tied to action. 
King Xuan's compassion for the ox's suffering, for example, 
led him to rescind the ox's execution. It is the heart behind 
this kind of action, according to Mencius, that allows one to 
become a true king. 43 Emotions, in Mencius, are often 
expressed in moral actions. This can be seen in the story of 
the child who was about to fall into the well. 
Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young 
child on the verge of falling into a well. He would 
certainly be moved to compassion, not because he 
wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, 
nor because he wished to win the praise of his 
fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he 
disliked the cry of the child.« 
The man, having judged the peril of the child, was moved to 
compassion: compassion refers to both the emotion and the 
accompanying action of rescuing the child. There would be no 
way the parents, villagers, or friends would recognize the 
compassion expressed by the man unless it was expressed by his 
ensuing actions. 45 As Roberts argues, "The expressions of 
43 Lau, Mencius, p. 55. 
«rbid., p.a2. 
45 Emotions, such as compassion, according to Wong, 
identify salient features of situations as reasons to act. 
The suffering of child, in this case, is the object of 
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emotion are not independent of emotion but built into the 
system of judgements that constitute the emotion ... the context 
of an emotion is not just a cognitive context, but an active 
context in which we are engaged in the world we care about."46 
In the Zhuangzi, emotions are often described as a source 
action, particularly ego-action. This can be seen in a 
conversation between Lao Laizi and Confucius. Lao Laizi says: 
You cannot bear to watch the sufferings of one age, 
and so you go and make trouble for ten thousand 
ages to come .... You take pride in practising 
charity and making people happy--the shame of it 
will follow you all of your days! These are the 
actions, the "progress" of mediocre men ... ~ 
Lao Laizi maintains that, because Confucius feels sorry for 
one age, he will cause trouble for thousands of ages. 
Confucius' judgement about people's suffering causes his 
feelings of anguish and compassion that, in turn, result in 
his works of charity. His judgement regarding the suffering of 
others has dictated the necessity of relieving not only his 
anguish, but also the pain of others. In other words, 
Confucius' emotion, directed at others, is expressed in his 
acts of charity. Confucius' judgement of others' suffering not 
only results in this specific emotion and ensuing action, it 
compassion. Perceiving the suffering of the child is seen as 
a reason to act in a helping way. Wong, "Is There a 
Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?" p. 32. 
46 Solomon, "On Emotions as Judgements," p. 188. 
47 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 297. 
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also serves to augment his pride and self-worth that will 
eventually generate confusion. Emotions do not only result in 
full blown, direct expressions such as hitting a wall when you 
are angry, they may also cause less observable results such as 
increasing one's sense of self worth. 
Emotions are described as having a behavioral context in 
Xunzi's thought as well. He claims emotions result in 
irrational behaviour such as wrangling and strife: 
... any man who follows his nature and indulges his 
emotions will inevitably become involved in 
wrangling and strife, will violate the forms and 
rules of society, and will end as a criminal.~ 
Emotions manifest themselves in seemingly pointless actions, 
actions that can only have negative effects on society. 
Actions that are deemed virtuous and principled lie outside 
the domain of emotions. Xunzi says: 
... for a son to relieve his father of work or a 
younger brother to relieve his elder brother--acts 
such as these are contrary to man's nature and run 
counter to his emotions. And yet they represent the 
way of filial piety and the proper forms enjoined 
by ritual principles. 0 
The filial action of a son helping his father is an action 
that runs counter to emotions. Is Xunzi claiming that a moral 
person is not subject to emotions? No, according to Xunzi, 
emotions that are not regulated result in irrational action; 
48 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p. 157. 
49 Ibid . , p • 16 0 • 
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emotions that are guided and shown proper expression result 
in principled, directed action. Xunzi says: 
Music is joy, an emotion which man cannot help but 
feel at times. Since man cannot help feeling joy, 
his joy must find an outlet in voice and an 
expression in movement .... Man must have his joy, 
and joy must have its expression, but if that 
expression is not guided by the principles of the 
Way, then it will inevitably become disordered. 50 
The joy that springs from music, like all emotion, has no 
recourse but to be expressed in action, in this case singing. 
Zhuangzi and other authors from the Warring States 
period, understand emotion to be systematically connected with 
action. 
Desires are also seen as closely connected to emotion. 
Desire readily functions as a stimulus for emotion and its 
corresponding expression. In the Zhuangzi the relationship 
between emotion and desire is depicted in the story of the 
monkey keeper who changed the feeding patterns of his monkeys. 
When the monkey trainer was handing out acorns, he 
said, "You get three in the morning and four at 
night." This made all the monkeys furious. "Well, 
then," he said, "you get four in the morning and 
three at night." The monkeys were all delighted. 
There was no change in the reality behind the 
words, and yet the monkeys responded with joy and 
anger. 51 
When the monkeys learned that they would get fewer acorns to 
eat in the morning, their desire for more led them to act with 
50 Ibid. I p. 112. 
51 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 41. 
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anger. Yet, when the monkeys believed their desire for more 
acorns was fulfilled they responded with joy. The desire for 
more acorns caused their emotional responses. 
Xunzi also speaks of desires and emotions: 
The nature of man is that he is born with a 
fondness for profit .... He is born with feelings of 
envy and hate, and if he indulges in these, they 
will lead him to violence and crime.n 
Our desire for wealth is accompanied by feelings of envy and 
hate. We envy others for having what we desire. Xunzi argues 
that, through the rites, both the desires and their 
accompanying emotions can attain harmony. 
Through rites Heaven and earth join in 
harmony ... men's likes and dislikes are regulated 
and their joys and hates made appropriate. 53 
Desire is intimately related to emotions: a variation in one's 
likes and dislikes results in a difference in one's joys and 
hates. Here, the intensity of our emotions reflects the 
intensity of our desires. Our emotions, therefore, have 
systematic connections with our desires. 
We can discern the intensity of emotions and desires in 
others on the basis of observed changes in facial expressions 
and body language. The attitude of the sage in old times, 
according to Zhuangzi, could be seen in his manner: 
Mild and cheerful, he seemed to be happy; 
52 Ibid., p. 157. 
53 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p. 94. 
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reluctant, he could not help doing certain things; 
annoyed, he let it show in his face; relaxed, he 
rested in virtue. Tolerant, he seemed to be part of 
the world; towering alone, he could be checked by 
nothing; withdrawn, he seemed to prefer to cut 
himself off; bemused, he forgot what he was going 
to say. 54 
One could judge when the sage was annoyed because it was 
revealed in his face. Xunzi, like Zhuangzi, also thinks 
physiological expressions indicate the kind of emotion present 
in a person. Xunzi says: 
Smiles and a beaming face, sorrow and a downcast 
look--these are expressions of the emotions of joy 
and sorrow which come with auspicious occasions or 
inauspicious occasions, and they appear naturally 
in the countenance.~ 
Smiles and a beaming face are expressions of joy, whereas a 
downcast look reveals the sorrow one is feeling. The idea that 
emotions can be noticed in others is in the Mencius as well. 
Presumably there must have been cases in ancient 
times of people not burying their parents. When the 
parents died, they were thrown in the gullies. Then 
one day the sons passed the place and there lay the 
bodies, eaten by foxes and sucked by flies. A sweat 
broke out on their brows, and they could not bear 
to look. The sweating was not put on for others to 
see. It was an outward expression of their most 
inner heart. 56 
The sorrow and guilt the sons felt upon seeing the decaying 
bodies of their parents was revealed by the sweat that broke 
54 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 79. 
~ Watson, Hsun Tzu, p. 101. 
56 Lau, Mencius, p. 105. 
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out on their brows. The sweat was an outward expression of 
their emotions of guilt and sorrow. 
Physical expressions and actions indicate the presence of 
emotion in others. Because they are telltale signs of emotion 
we can claim they are "empirically necessary"57 to it. 
Emotions can be observed in facial expressions or in the 
actions of others. 
Although the Zhuangzi, the Mencius, and the Xunzi do not 
specifically discuss what an emotion is, by examining various 
passages we are able to outline features implicit in their 
concept of emotion. Judgements, actions, desires, and physical 
mannerisms may be components of emotion. Although each of 
these features can exist independent of emotion they are, 
nevertheless, intimately tied to emotion. All four features 
may be found with a specific emotion or just one or two of 
these features may be present. Judgements, which consist of 
suppositions, beliefs, and evaluations, are essential 
according to Mencius and Zhuangzi because differences in 
emotions are accounted for by differences in judgements. They 
are not, however, necessary features of emotion in the Xunzi. 
Emotions, according to Xunzi, are spontaneous. Emotions are 
often expressed in action in the Mencius, the Xunzi, and the 
57 When describing the relationship between emotions and 
physical changes Stephen Leighton in "Modern Theories of 
Emotion," uses this expression, p. 216. 
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Zhuangzi. Compassion for the suffering of others, for example, 
leads people to act in ways to alleviate the suffering. Desire 
is often a component of emotion as well. Desire may lead to 
certain emotions or desire may be present with any 
corresponding emotion as in the Xunzi. Physical responses, 
like weeping and a sad face, indicate the presence of emotion 
in people. Judgements, actions, desires, and physical 
expressions are characteristics that normally define the 
nature of emotion in Warring states texts. 
Zhuangzi's understanding of emotion is not unique. When 
Zhuangzi, Mencius, and Xunzi discuss emotions they are all 
working with pre-existing ideas of what an emotion is. Their 
statements and anecdotes about emotions are full of ideas 
about contextual judgements, behavioral patterns, desires and 
physical states. The presence of these characteristics in 
other texts suggests that Zhuangzi's idea of what is necessary 
for emotion was common in his day. A general agreement, then, 
about emotion can be found in most philosophical Warring 
States texts. 
Chapter Four: Emotions in the Zhuangzi : A comparison 
of Zhuanqzi•s View of Emotions to Those of 
Hencius• and Xunzi's 
We have seen that Zhuangzi's concept of what constitutes 
an emotion is not unique, but, it does not necessarily follow 
that what he has to say about emotions is similar to other 
Warring states philosophers. There are two questions 
concerning Zhuangzi's view of emotions that I am concerned 
with: what does he say about the role emotion plays in the 
self? and is this view similar to, or distinct from, Mencius' 
or Xunzi's? 
In order to examine Zhuangzi's attitude toward emotion, 
I will begin by looking at what he has to say about emotions 
in passages where emotional states are the general topic of 
discussion. To further investigate his view of emotions, I 
will consider how emotions relate to his idea of human nature, 
mind-heart, and the way of the ideal person. Then, we can 
compare this to what Mencius and Xunzi have to say about 
emotion. 
In Zhuangzi's view, emotions are usually negative. 
Emotions are qualities that disrupt the natural order of 
things including the way in which human beings should live. 
This can be seen in the story where Master Su asked Master Yu, 
who has fallen ill and become disfigured, whether or not he 
resented his illness. Master Yu answered: 
I received life because the time had come; I will 
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lose it because the order of things passes on. Be 
content with this time and dwell in this order and 
then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In 
ancient times this was called the "freeing of the 
bond." There are those who cannot free themselves, 
because they are bound by things. But nothing can 
ever win against Heaven--that's the way its always 
been. What would I have to resent?58 
Joy and sorrow are not part of the natural order. If people 
are able to avoid these feelings then they will automatically 
be relieved. They will be "xuanjie," "free of bonds" that bind 
people to an world where the Way is disrupted. To be 
influenced by emotions, according to one commentator, is just 
as painful as to hang somebody upside down. 59 Those who are 
"xuanjie" are free of emotional entanglements, they, like 
Master Yu, do not lament their plight or fear for their 
inevitable demise, rather, they live peacefully and 
harmoniously. 
Emotions such as love, expressed in a world without the 
Dao, according to Zhuangz i, are the products of virtues 
created by human beings to bring order in the world. The 
Zhuangzi says: 
There is nothing difficult about attracting the 
people. Love them and they will feel affection for 
you, benefit them and they will flock to you, 
praise them and they will do their best, do 
something they dislike and they will scatter. Love 
58 Ibid. I p. 84. 
59 Wang Fuzhi, Zhuangzi Jie: Zhuangzi Tung (The Complete 
Annotated Notes to the Zhuangzi) (Taibei: Chi Hai Publications, 
1984) 1 P• 79. 
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and benefit are the products of benevolence and 
righteousness. There are few who will renounce 
benevolence and righteousness, but many who will 
seek to benefit by them. To practice benevolence 
and righteousness in such a fashion is a best a 
form of insincerity, at worst a deliberate lending 
of weapons to the evil and rapacious.~ 
Benevolence and righteousness, in Zhuangzi's view, are human 
conventions that enable us to appease our greed. Through 
benevolence people will attain power and position by 
exhibiting love and benefit, in other words, through them they 
are able to manipulate others to follow their will. 
Benevolence and righteousness are not values that strengthen 
society but are things that are fashioned by human beings and 
that ultimately destroy society. They are weapons, wrapped in 
ideals, that meet the needs of selfish and greedy people. As 
Zhuangzi says: "[W)hen joy is complete, this is called the 
fulfilment of ambition."M Joy is the product of self 
fulfilment: the completion of our desires. Emotions, such as 
joy and love, are the concern of a world ruled by ambition and 
greed. 
Emotions hinder us from realizing the unity of the Dao: 
Eminence and wealth, recognition and authority, 
fame and profit--these six are delusions of the 
will. Appearances and carriage, complexion and 
features, temperament and attitude--these six are 
snares of the heart. Loathing and desire, joy and 
anger, grief and happiness--these six are 
~ Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p.275. 
61 Ibid. I p. 174. 
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entanglements of virtue. Rejecting and accepting, 
taking and giving, knowledge and ability--these six 
are roadblocks of the Way. When these four sixes no 
longer seethe within the breast, ... you will be 
still; being still you will be enlightened; being 
enlightened you will be empty; and being empty, you 
will do nothing, and yet there will be nothing not 
done. 62 
When we discard feelings of loathing, joy, anger, grief, and 
happiness we become still and empty like the Dao. Ambition and 
greed will disappear, and order and harmony will exist as it 
did before the Way was lost. If emotions like joy and grief 
impede the Way, it seems straightforward then, for Zhuangzi to 
argue they are not part of the make-up of human beings. 
He has the form of a man but not the feelings 
[qing] of a man. Since he has the form of a man, he 
bands together with other men. Since he doesn't 
have the feelings [qing] of a man, right and wrong 
cannot get at him. Puny and small, he sticks with 
the rest of men. Massive and great, he perfects his 
heaven alone. 63 
The sage, who is the natural human being par excellence, has 
the physical constitution of other human beings, yet he 
differs from them because he lacks emotion. 
Emotions, on a whole, are seen as unnatural, as obstacles 
of the Way, and as unessential characteristics of the natural 
person. There are, however, a few passages where emotions are 
portrayed in a positive light. 
Joy, anger, grief, 
62 Ibid • , p • 2 59 • 
63 Ibid., p. 75. 
delight, worry, regret, 
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fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, wilfulness, 
candour, insolence .•.. Without them we would not 
exist; without us they would have nothing to take 
hold of. This comes close to the matter. But I do 
not know what makes them the way they are. It would 
seem as though they have some True Master, and yet 
I find no trace of him. He can act--that is 
certain. Yet I cannot see his form. He has identity 
[qing] but no form.M 
The true man's identity rests in his emotions. He has feelings 
of joy, anger, grief, and delight. The sage, here, has the 
feelings of a human being but not the form of one. This 
passage is a direct contrast to the one above that says the 
sage has the form of a man but not the feelings of a one. 
Similarly, there is a passage that has Confucius describing 
Meng-sun, a man of unique understanding, whose emotions 
remained a part of him no matter what trial he has to face. 
And when he is changing, how does he know that he 
hasn't already changed? You and I, now--we are 
dreaming and haven't waked up yet. But in his case, 
though something may startle his body, it won't 
injure his mind; though something may alarm the 
house [his spirit lives in], his emotions [qing] 
will suffer no death.M 
Though something may frighten or scare Meng-sun, his emotions 
will persist. Emotions, in this passage, are portrayed as 
qualities to be conserved and Meng-sun is praised for his 
ability to do so. In these two passages, emotions are depicted 
as characteristics of the ideal person. 
M Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
65 Ibid. I p. 88. 
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By examining a few passages in the Dao De Jing and the 
Liezi we can see that emotions are usually viewed in a 
negative manner in Daoist thought. As in the Zhuangzi, 
emotions in the Dao De Jing are not a part of the natural 
world. 
The way never acts yet nothing is left undone. 
Should lords and princes be able to hold fast to it, 
The myriad creatures will be transformed of their own 
accord. 
After they are transformed, should desire raise its head, 
I shall press it down with the weight of the nameless, 
uncarved block. 
The nameless uncarved block 
Is but freedom from desire, 
And if I cease to desire and remain still, 
The empire will be at peace of its own accord.M 
The empire is at rest when people are not influenced by their 
passions. Passions with their strong feelings and desires 
belong to a colourful, artificial world, they are not a part 
of the natural world in which human beings should reside. The 
natural world, in Laozi's thought, is colourless, without 
flair or passion. Through the Dao the ten thousand creatures 
are as they should be: desireless and emotionless. 
In the Liezi emotions are considered not to be a part of 
the natural course of life. This can be seen in Liezi' s 
description of the ideal society: 
It is a place which you cannot reach by boat or 
carriage or on foot, only by a journey of the 
spirit. In this country there are no teachers and 
M D. c. Lau, trans, Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, chapter 37 
(London: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 96. 
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leaders; all things follow their natural course. 
The people have no cravings and lusts; all men 
follow their natural course. They are incapable of 
delighting in life or hating death, and therefore 
none of them dies before his time. They do not know 
how to prefer themselves to others, and so they 
neither love nor hate .... There is nothing at all 
which they grudge or regret, nothing which they 
dread or envy. 67 
In this country people are not motivated to satisfy their 
desires and emotional needs because they follow a natural 
course. They are not egocentric: they make no distinctions 
between themselves and others and they are not anxious over 
their inevitable demise. By following their natures they 
remain unaffected by love, hate, regret, dread, and envy. When 
we follow our natural course we are not subject to emotional 
turmoil. Feelings and desires, according to Liezi, disrupt the 
harmony we have at birth. 
From his birth to his end, man passes through four 
great changes: infancy, youth, old age, death. In 
infancy his energies are concentrated and his 
inclinations are one--the ultimate of harmony. 
Other things do not harm him, nothing can add to 
the virtue in him. In youth, the energies in his 
blood are in turmoil and overwhelm him, desires and 
cares rise up and fill him. Others attack him, 
therefore the virtue wanes in him. When he is old, 
desires and cares weaken, his body is about to 
rest. Nothing contends to get ahead of him, and 
although he has not reached the perfection of 
infancy, compared with his youth there is a great 
difference for the better. When he dies, he goes to 
his rest, rises again to his zenith.~ 
67 A. C. Graham, trans., The Book of Lieh-t;zu (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 34. 
68 Ib 'd 23 ~ • I P• • 
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Infancy, youth, old age, and death come from the spontaneous 
movement of qi. When we are born this energy is harmonious, in 
youth, it is erratic because we are motivated by emotions and 
desires. Our feelings and their ensuing desires produce 
intentional actions and because this is contrary to qi, our 
de, life force, dwindles away. Emotions excite and agitate 
what is naturally calm and spontaneous, they, therefore, 
create chaos within us. Through this confusion we become 
concerned with things like morality and, as a consequence, we 
develop principles like benevolence and propriety, which, as 
Zhuangzi has said, is similar to lending weapons to evil 
people. Emotions and desires lead us to develop an artificial 
order because they blind us to the inherent harmony in things. 
In Daoist thought emotions are normally seen as unnatural 
qualities. They are not a part of the natural order nor 
characteristic of human beings. Emotions, nevertheless, exist; 
they are a part of everyday expression. What role then, 
according to Zhuangzi, do they play in our lives? We can begin 
to answer this question by looking at the relationship between 
emotions and Zhuangzi's concepts of xing, nature, and xin, 
mind-heart and by examining his ideal of the perfected person. 
Any discussion of xing occurs in the Miscellaneous and 
Outer Chapters of the Zhuangzi. These chapters are considered 
by most scholars to be later additions to the Zhuangzi. The 
Inner Chapters are thought to be the authentic work of Zhuang 
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Chou who lived and wrote during the Warring States period. 
Interestingly, we do not find the character xing used in the 
Inner Chapters. This is probably because it was not used at 
this time or because it was a relatively new character that 
was being used by some philosophers of that period to refer to 
the "essence" or the "nature" of a person. Theories concerning 
the history of xing are based on its two components: xin and 
sheng. Xing is made up of the xin radical, which refers to 
"mind-heart," and the sheng radical meaning "to produce," "to 
give birth," "born with" and "life." The sheng part of the 
character is emphasized by Fu Sinian. He argues that the xing 
one reads in the Mencius, the Xunzi, and other Warring States 
texts were written as sheng until the Han dynasty when they 
were changed to xing. The xin component, he says, has no 
significance in xing. 69 Munro, on the other hand, maintains 
that the xin radical is central to the meaning of xing and 
that the term was being used in the Warring States period. 
However, Munro, like Fu Sinian, says that xing evolved from 
sheng and that, like sheng, it was used to mean "life." It 
refers to the vitality or activity that one has from birth in 
the form of growth or in response to one's environment. The 
xin radical, he argues, eventually became added to sheng 
69 Fu Sinian, Xing Ming Gu Xun Pianzheng (Critical Studies 
of Classical Interpretations of Nature and Destiny), Vol. 1 
(Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1947), pp.35-37. 
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because people were generally interested in the nature of 
human beings and the mind was considered to be an unique 
attribute of humanity. Xing, according to Munro, refers to the 
specific regular behaviour unique to a species and the social 
tendencies brought to the fore by an evaluating mind. 70 Graham 
takes a middle position. He argues that sheng and xing were 
used indifferently in Warring States texts. Nature, in these 
texts, referred to the natural term of life, therefore, 
whichever word was used made little difference to the meaning 
of the text. Xing, he says, may have been used during the 
Warring states period but its usage, in any case, developed 
only gradually. 
Zhuangzi's definition of xing found in a terse 
definition: Xing zhe sheng zhi zhi ye, "[T]he inborn nature is 
the substance of life. "71 Nature is the life or substance of 
a thing produced by the Dao. The Dao, according to Zhuangzi, 
is a process that impartially produces all things, including 
human beings. 
Out of the flow and flux, things were born, and 
they grew and developed distinctive shapes; these 
were called forms. These forms and held within them 
70 The mind becomes associated with social tendencies in 
Confucian texts such as the Mencius. Munro recognizes that 
this is not the case for Daoist texts like the Dao De Jing and 
the Zhuangzi. In fact, for Zhuangzi, the mind is simple and 
non-evaluating; it simply reflects whatever is put before it. 
Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, pp. 75-77. 
71 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 259. 
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spirits, each with its own characteristics and 
limitations, and this was their inborn nature. 72 
Xing, inborn nature, refers to that which is naturally given, 
it is the characteristics and limitations that are given to a 
thing at birth. Human nature, in the Zhuangzi, is not 
distinguished from the xing of other things. It is defined by 
what is plain and natural. 
To weave for their clothing, to till for their 
food--this is the Virtue they share .... In this age 
of Perfect Virtue men live the same as birds and 
beasts, group themselves side by side with the ten 
thousand things .... Dull and unwitting they have no 
desire; this is called uncarved simplicity. In 
uncarved simplicity the people attain their true 
nature [xing] . 73 
Just as it is the xing of a horse to eat grass and to drink 
water it is the xing of human beings to weave and clothe 
themselves, and to plough and eat. In the age of perfect 
virtue, we, like animals, perform functions that are necessary 
for survival, namely, securing food and shelter. This is the 
natural course of human beings. 
For in the world there can be a constant 
naturalness. Where there is a constant naturalness, 
things are arced not by the use of a curve, 
straight not by the use of a plumb line, ... Then all 
things in the world, simple, compliant, live and 
never know how the,X happen to live; all things, 
rude and unwitting. 4 
12 Ibid., p. 131-132. 
73 Ibid. , p. 105. 
74 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
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When we follow our natural course we are simple, compliant, 
and unaware. Dull and stupid, we live without knowing how we 
do so and we remain unaffected by the hustle and bustle we 
associate with civilised life. Human life in its natural guise 
is, in Wu Kuang-ming's words, "uncluttered tranquillity."75 
Xing that is simple and placid is our constant nature. 
Human nature, nevertheless, is dynamic. Human xing involves a 
set of conditions we are born into, but it is also dynamic in 
that it can be shaped by surrounding conditions. 76 The 
changeability of human nature, according to Zhuangzi, is 
counter productive. Our constant nature, those set of 
conditions which we were born into, is the human ideal. Adding 
things to it generates problems: Zhuangzi says: 
People of today, when they come to ordering their 
bodies and regulating their minds, too often do it 
in a manner like that which the border guard 
described. They turn their backs on the heavenly 
part, deviate from the inborn nature [xing], 
destroy the true form [qing], and annihilate the 
spirit, just to be doing what the crowd is doing. 
So he who is slipshod with his inborn nature will 
find the evils of desire and hate affecting his 
inborn nature [xing] like weeds and rushes.n 
People who try to direct their minds and bodies do not act in 
accordance with their inborn nature. By acting in this manner 
75 Wu Kuang-ming, World Philosopher at Play, p. 65. 
76For more information on the concept of the changeability 
of xing see Roger Ames ' "The Mencian Concept of Ren Xing: Does 
it mean "Human Nature?" 
TI Ibid., pp. 286-287. 
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they end up cultivating emotions and desires and destroying 
their spirits and their bodies. Emotions are external 
qualities that destroy the inborn nature. They are like weeds 
and rushes that strangle what is essential. 
What is innate in human beings is unadorned. When people 
become concerned with feelings of benevolence and 
righteousness they mar their inborn nature. They stress these 
feelings in order to strengthen the bonds between kin and 
human beings, yet, they end up generating selfishness in the 
world: 
He who is fork-fingered with benevolence will tear 
out the Virtue given him and stifle his inborn 
nature [xing] in order to seize fame and 
reputation, leading the world on with pipe and drum 
in the service of an unattainable ideal--am I 
wrong?78 
People act in benevolent ways because they see it as a means 
to seize fame and reputation. Therefore, when we add things, 
like compassion and love, to xing it becomes warped and 
deranged. 
Emotions characterize the person whose xing is blighted; 
they are foreign to one's original nature. In the Zhuangzi, 
then, there are two types of xing: constant and adorned. The 
constant nature is plain and natural and the adorned nature is 
complicated by things like emotions and virtues. Our original 
nature becomes adorned when we add external things to it. As 
78 b 'd I~., p. 99. 
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Zhuangzi says: 
Delight and sorrow are there to trap man on either 
side so that he has no escape. Fearful and 
trembling, he can reach no completion. His mind is 
as though trussed and suspended between heaven and 
earth. 79 
Delight, sorrow, and fear are traps that keep human beings 
from their constant nature. Emotions confound the simple, 
uncomplicated nature that we are born with. 
The xin, mind-heart, is discussed in the Inner Chapters 
of the Zhuangzi in much the same way as xing is in the outer 
and Miscellaneous Chapters. In fact, in the early use of xin 
in the text, it can "stand in" for xing. Zhuangzi speaks of a 
constant xin and an "adorned" xin. The constant xin and xing 
refer to that which was naturally given to human beings. They 
are both described as placid and plain. As well, the "adorned" 
xin, like the "adorned" nature of human beings is made up of 
things like emotions and desires. That xin should have the 
same meaning as xing is not unusual. In early China xin and 
xing were closely related and shared many characteristics. 
Both were made up of emotions, desires, and cognitive thought. 
The mind-heart was regarded as a unique attribute of human 
beings. Both Mencius and Xunzi, for example, focused on it in 
their discussions of human nature. Mencius argues that the 
four xin--compassion, shame, respect, and feelings of right 
79 b 'd I~., p. 295. 
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and wrong-- are innate in human beings and Xunzi claims that 
human beings are born with emotions and conscious thought. 
Their concepts of xing are either defined by xin or are 
aspects of it. 80 
The constant mind is characteristic of the human being 
whose nature is the same as it was when she was born: whole 
and simple. 
If a man follows the mind given to him and makes it 
his teacher, then who can be without a teacher? Why 
must you comprehend the process of change and form 
your mind on that basis before you can become a 
teacher? But to fail to abide by this mind and 
still insist upon your rights and wrongs--this is 
like saying that you set off for Yueh today and got 
there yesterday. This is to claim what doesn't 
exist exists. 81 
The mind that we are given at birth is our teacher. When we 
insist that comprehension, knowledge, and ideas of right and 
wrong are necessary prerequisites before approaching a teacher 
we end up creating confusion. The constant mind, like one's 
inborn nature, is a part of the flux and flow of the Dao; on 
the other hand, things like viewpoints, which arise from 
evaluating what is right or wrong, are not a part of it. They 
are characteristic of the adorned mind. Zhuangzi says that one 
80 Descriptions of the constant mind and the "adorned" 
mind of wayward people continue throughout the Zhuangzi. In 
the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters, there are passages that 
refer to the both the constant mind and the constant nature, 
they are, nevertheless, roughly synonymous. 
81 b 'd I~ ., pp. 38-39. 
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who retains the original mind, 
... doesn't know what his ears and eyes should 
approve--he lets his mind play in the harmony of 
virtue. As for things, he sees them as one and does 
not see their loss. He regards the loss of a foot 
as a lump of earth thrown away. 82 
When we hold to the beginning we do not evaluate or make 
distinctions between things. When we see all things as one, a 
foot is seen as having no more value than a clump of earth. 
The constant mind is uncomplicated and without prejudice. 
Zhuangzi says, "[P)roof that a man is holding fast to the 
beginning lies in his fearlessness. " 83 We can distinguish 
those who follow the original mind from those who do not by 
their lack of emotion. If we do not judge something as 
dangerous or harmful we will be fearless. Emotions come from 
our evaluations and the distinctions we make among things. 
Hence, they are not part of the constant mind-heart. 
People's minds can be altered from their original states 
when things like emotions influence them. The Zhuangzi tells 
us not meddle with the mind: 
Lao Tan said, "Be careful--don't meddle with men's 
minds [xin]! Men's minds [xin] can be forced down 
or boosted up, but this drowning and upping 
imprisons and brings death to the mind [xin]. 
Gentle and shy the mind [xin] can be hard and 
strong; it can chisel and cut away, carve and 
82 Ibid. , p. 69. 
83 Ibid. , p. 69. 
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polish .... This indeed is the mind [xin] of man.M 
When we interfere with the mind its becomes divided and 
changed from its original, complete state. The "adorned" mind 
is the constant mind altered. It becomes adorned when it is 
moulded by things such as benevolence, righteousness, and 
fear. "In ancient times the Yellow Emperor first used 
benevolence and righteousness to meddle with the minds of 
men. " 85 Benevolent and righteous behaviour destroys the 
constant mind. These types of social behaviour are preceded by 
an evaluation of situation that dictates the proper moral 
action necessary to it. The evaluation plus the directed moral 
action involved in both benevolence and righteousness only 
serves to confound the mind. When the mind becomes divided and 
confused it becomes irrational and beset with fears. 
In sleep, men's spirits go visiting; in waking 
hours, their bodies hustle. With everything they 
meet they become entangled. Day after day they use 
their minds [xin] in strife, sometimes grandiose, 
sometimes sly, sometimes petty. Their little fears 
are mean and trembly; their great fears are stunned 
and overwhelming. 86 
People who are entangled in the hustle of society are bound by 
fears both mean and overwhelming. Because of their fears they 
learn how to use their minds in sly and petty ways; in ways 
M Ibid. I p. 116. 
85 Ibid. I p. 116. 
86 Ibid. I p. 3 7. 
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that manipulate a situation for their self gratification. 
Human beings can come back to their original xing and xin 
by mind-fasting. By getting rid of emotion we can return to 
the beginning, or as the Zhuangzi says, "to serve your own 
mind so that sadness and joy cannot sway it. " 87 When we no 
longer allow our minds to be affected by emotions, along with 
the evaluations and actions involved with them, can we return 
to our original selves. 
Just go along with things and let your mind move 
freely. Resign yourself to what cannot be avoided 
and nourish what is within you--this is best. What 
more do you have to do to fulfil your mission? 
Nothing is as good as following orders (obeying 
fate)--that's how difficult it is.~ 
People can get rid of their emotions by not forcing or 
changing the way things are. Zhuangzi's idea is to allow the 
mind to move freely and spontaneously. The way to achieve that 
is simply to follow fate by living in accordance with those 
characteristics that we were given at birth. Since emotions 
are not among the qualities that are inherent in us, we can 
discard them by avoiding convention and following what is 
natural. 
Emotions, in the Zhuangzi, are not characteristic of the 
mind-heart, rather, they are characteristic of an evaluative 
87 Ibid. I p. 60. 
88 Ibid. I p. 61. 
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mind. 89 The evaluative mind makes judgements and decides 
corresponding actions. This kind of mind compels us to live 
unnaturally because it can not help but force order, 
structure, and values on a mind-heart that should be 
uncomplicated. Zhuangzi 's goal, and that of philosophical 
Daoism in general, is to get people to realize that the 
evaluative mind is contrary to the Dao, that it forces people 
to live in conditions foreign to their natures which, in turn, 
causes them needless pain and suffering. As human beings we 
cannot hope to find harmony and peace until we regain the mind 
we were born with. Zhuangz i exhorts us to discard this 
"evaluative" mind and regain our constant one by discarding 
all of our emotions. If the mind remains unswayed by feelings, 
like sadness and joy, then people will no longer feel grief at 
the death of a loved one, they will be not be ashamed of 
things like poverty, and they will not fear death. In other 
words, they will be free from the shackles of everyday life. 
The sage, in the Zhuangzi, is the perfected person who is 
unaffected by emotions. Being free of emotion she is objective 
and can, therefore, treat all things equally and without 
favour. What does Zhuangzi say about the sage? 
The True Man of ancient times did not rebel against 
want, did not grow proud in plenty, and did not 
89 Donald Munro in The Concept of Man in Early China uses 
the phrase "evaluative mind" in his description of human 
nature in the Mencius and the Xunzi. 
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plan his affairs. A man like this could commit an 
error and not regret it, could meet with success 
and not make a show. A man like this could climb 
the high places and not be frightened, could enter 
water and not get wet, could enter fire and not get 
burned .... The True Man breathes with his heels; the 
mass of men breathe with their throats. Crushed and 
bound down, they grasp out their words as though 
they were retching. Deep in their passions and 
desires, they are shallow in the workings of 
Heaven. 
The True Man Of ancient times knew nothing of 
loving life, knew nothing of hating death.w 
The sage does not get angry and rebel when she is hungry, she 
is not affected by pride, and she knows nothing of loving life 
or hating death. She, unlike ordinary people who are consumed 
by their desires and passions, is capable of amazing feats: 
she can enter the water and not get wet and he can enter a 
fire without getting hurt. The sage seems able to accomplish 
the most exceptional act because she is untouched by emotion. 
It is emotion that separates the sage and her activities from 
the ordinary person. The sage, in the Zhuangzi, is aloof, she 
is not engaged in the world, therefore, she is not affected by 
the passions of everyday life. Such a person, the Zhuangzi 
says: 
... will leave the gold hidden in the mountains, the 
pearls hidden in the depths. He will see no profit 
in money and goods, no enticement in eminence and 
wealth, no joy in long life, no grief in early 
death, no honor in affluence, no shame in 
poverty .... His glory is enlightenment, (for he 
knows that] the ten thousand things belong to one 
storehouse, that life and death share the same 
~Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, pp. 77-78. 
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body. 91 
The sage is not guided by her love of wealth and its ensuing 
prominence, she cares little for a long healthy life, and 
death and shame have no meaning for her. 
Having no emotions, the sage is the embodiment of the 
constant nature and the constant mind, thus the sage is one 
with the Dao. Chang Ji asks Confucius if the sage really does 
have some way of bringing the mind to completion and in what 
unique way the sage uses her mind. Confucius says, 
Life and death are great affairs, and yet they are 
no change to him. Though heaven and earth flop over 
and fall down, it is no loss to him. He sees 
clearly into what has no falsehood and does not 
shift with things. He takes it as fate that things 
should change, and he holds fast to the source.~ 
The sage is able .to bring her mind to completion because she 
neither loves life or hates death, and she would care little 
if heaven and earth came to an end. Things cannot get in and 
affect her because she realizes that all things come and go 
because they are a part of the continuous flux and flow of the 
mother of all things, the Dao. The sage, therefore, is able to 
make her mind like a mirror. 
The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror--going 
after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but 
not storing. Therefore he can win out over things 
91 Ibid. I pp. 127-128. 
~ Ibid. I p. 69. 
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and not hurt himself. 93 
The perfect person uses her mind to respond objectively to any 
situation. She is unaffected by her environment--its rules, 
institutions, values, family and kin--because she neither 
seeks nor welcomes them. She lives in society but she does not 
participate in it.~ The mirror symbol, according to Graham, 
illustrates that the mind is not "subject to the agitations 
that obscure the common man's clarity of vision. " 95 Joy, 
anger, hatred, regret, and so on cloud our vision because they 
are based on the content of individual beliefs and 
evaluations. Emotions make distinctions between things, they 
make us view life as worthy of living because we believe it to 
be good and to see death as deserving of our hate because we 
perceive as the end of the self. Yet life and death, according 
to Zhuangzi, are the same. The mind that is without emotion is 
characteristic of the mirror because "[A] mirror accepts 
whatever is put before it without interpretation, judgement, 
or desire ... A mirror applies no interpretations; it simply 
93 Ibid., p. 97. 
~ The mirror symbol is discussed by at length by Lee 
Yearly in his "The Perfected Person in the Radical Zhuangzi 
and by A. C. Graham in his "Taoist Spontaneity and the 
Dichotomy of 'Is' and 'Ought.'" Both of these articles can be 
found in Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, Victor H. Mair, 
ed. (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1983). 
95 Graham, "The Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of 
'Is' and •ought. "' p. 10. 
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reflects any new image put before it. " 96 The image of the 
mirror symbolizes the constant mind of the natural human being 
who is unaffected by emotion. 
The natural human being, in the Zhuangzi, is without 
emotion. This is evident in Zhuangzi's description of the xing 
and xin and in his description of the sage. Both the xing and 
xin are depicted as plain and uncomplicated by things such as 
values, virtues and emotions. In fact, emotions like joy and 
anger are shown to be characteristic of ordinary people who 
have altered their natures by allowing themselves to be 
subjected to artificiality. These people are controlled by 
their feelings of love and anger, and they are doomed to the 
pain and suffering that follow them. The sage, on the other 
hand, is one who is free and spontaneous. By discarding 
emotions she is able to regain her nature and return to the 
beginning where there is unity and harmony in all things. 
Zhuangzi's view of emotions is somewhat unusual and one 
has to ask whether or not his views were common during the 
Warring States period. By comparing his view of emotions to 
that of Mencius and Xunzi we can determine if his view of 
emotions is unique. 
Zhuangzi 's view of emotions differs considerably from 
that of Mencius. Emotions, in Mencius, are seen in a much more 
96 Lee Yearly, "The Perfected Person in Radical Chuang-
tzu. " p. 13 3. 
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favourable light. Where Zhuangzi talks about ren, benevolence, 
as something that tears apart one original nature, Mencius 
defines humanity in respect to it. "Benevolence," he says, 
"means 'man.' When these two are cojoined, the result is 'the 
Way'." 97 To be human is to be generous, kind and loving. The 
way or method to create a harmonious society is for human 
beings to become ren. In Mencius, a person who has no 
compassion is alienated from society. Mencius says: 
A man who mutilates benevolence is a mutilator, 
while one who cripples rightness is a crippler. He 
who is both a mutilator and a crippler is an 
"outcast. " 98 
In Zhuangzi, it is the person who practices benevolence that 
is the mutilator because it is this person who destroys that 
which is naturally given. In Mencius' thought, Zhuangzi would 
be seen as a mutilator and an outcast because of his 
disparaging remarks about ren. 
In the Mencius, emotions can be constructive. While 
emotions like ren create good relations among people, other 
emotions, such as shame, encourage people to achieve moral 
ideals. Mencius says: 
Great is the use of shame to man. He who indulges 
in craftiness has no use for shame. If a man is not 
ashamed of being inferior to other men, how will he 
97 Lau, Mencius, p. 197. 
98 Ibid., p. 68. 
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ever become their equal?~ 
Shame motivates people to reach for higher standards. Feelings 
of benevolence, compassion, and shame are seen by Mencius as 
positive qualities in human beings. 
Emotions, in the Mencius, are thought to be innate in 
human beings. People's innate sensitivity to others can be 
seen in the story of the child who almost fell into the 
well. 100 Anyone, according to Mencius, would react almost 
instantly to save the child on the verge of falling in the 
well not because this would win him the praise of others but 
because he is aware of the suffering of the child. In order to 
save the child a person would not have sufficient time to 
think of how saving the child would benefit him. It is the 
possibility of the child's death that leads one to react 
instantly to save the child. Our innate sensitivity for others 
shows itself in situations where another's well being is at 
stake. People have mind-hearts sensitive to others because 
they are born with the four xin. 
The heart of compassion is possessed by all men 
alike; likewise the heart of shame, the heart of 
respect, and the heart of right and wrong. The 
heart of compassion pertains to benevolence, the 
~ Ibid. I p. 183. 
100 Ibid., p. 82. "Suppose a man were all of a sudden, to 
see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He 
would certainly be moved to compassion .... " This passage and 
the connection of emotion and morality have been discussed on 
pp. 30-31. 
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heart of shame to dutifulness, the heart of respect 
to the observance of the rites, and the heart of 
right and wrong to wisdom. Benevolence, 
dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom 
are not welded on me from the outside; they are in 
me originally . 101 
Human beings are sensitive to others because they are born 
with feelings of compassion, shame, respect, and with feelings 
of right and wrong. These innate sensitivities are the 
beginnings of emotional and moral states. Compassion, feelings 
of right and wrong and so on are the initial defining 
conditions that human beings are born with. Emotions, or at 
least the beginnings of emotions, in Mencius, are innate, they 
are not imposed externally on human beings over a lifetime as 
they are in the Zhuangzi. 
Human beings are capable of becoming good because we are 
born with these innate sensitivities that with nourishment 
become the four virtues: benevolence, dutifulness, observance 
of rites, and wisdom. These virtues enhance both our 
behavioral and evaluative tendencies. Ren and li, as Munro 
argues, lead to behavioral constants unique to human beings 
and yi and zhi denote evaluative activity. Compassion becomes 
jen, or compassionate activity, respect emerges as li in 
practice, that is, good form in conduct, the heart of shame 
manifests itself as yi, our innate moral sense that determines 
101 Ibid., p. 163. 
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what is or is not proper, and zhi becomes wisdom. 102 These 
evaluative tendencies guide our social behaviour. In Munro's 
words: "[T]he evaluating mind determines what response is 
right for a particular situation, and when the behaviour 
actually occurs, human heartedness and good form are 
realized. 103 If people live in accordance with the four 
virtues, then, they become moral, social beings. We are born 
with the potential to be good, therefore, it is our nature to 
be good. 104 
If we compare Mencius' thought here regarding emotions 
102 Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, pp. 74-75. 
Wong, similarly, in his "Is there a Distinction Between 
Emotion and Reason in Mencius" talks about the four xin in 
terms of evaluative and behavioral tendencies. 
103 Ibid, p. 76. 
104 The idea that nourishing one's emotions enables one to 
become a moral person can be seen in the story of King Xuan. 
Mencius shows the king that his compassion for the ox about to 
die can be extended to his rule of the people. Mencius says to 
King Xuan, "Your bounty is sufficient to reach the animals, 
yet the benefits of your government fail to reach the people. 
That a feather is not lifted is because one fails to make the 
effort; that a cartload of firewood is not seen is because one 
fails to use one's eyes. Similarly, that peace is not brought 
to the people is because you fail to practice kindness ... all 
you have to do is take this very heart here and apply it to 
what is over there." Just as the king' s compassion for the 
ox's suffering lead him to cancel its execution, the king can 
nourish this trait so that his actions toward his people will 
be similarly benevolent. The king can become jen by extending 
his heart of compassion for the ox to "what is over there." 
Lau, pp. 56-57. The conversation between King Xuan and Mencius 
can be seen in Lau, pp. 54-59. A more complete discussion of 
this idea can be found in Wong's "Is There a Distinction 
Between Emotion and Reason in Mencius?" 
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and human nature to that of Zhuangzi's, we can see that their 
views on emotions are largely dependant upon their views of 
what is innate. In the Mencius, emotions in part make up what 
is inborn as well as the nature of the moral, compassionate 
person. Feelings are viewed as a potential that, given 
development, will lead to the benevolent, ethical human being. 
For Zhuangzi, one's constant nature is less colourful, it is 
plain, uncomplicated and suited to mere survival. The adorned 
nature is one that is unduly affected by emotions and 
morality. Zhuangzi does not view the changeability of nature 
as actualizing some given potential. The dynamic property of 
xing is dubious, in Zhuangzi, because it means that one's 
original nature, which is the optimal state for human beings, 
will become flawed. It becomes flawed when we are influenced 
by emotions. The way Zhuangzi sees it "the rules of 
benevolence and righteousness and the paths of right and wrong 
are all hopelessly snarled and jumbled. 11105 
Xunzi, in contrast to his predecessor Mencius, has a 
negative attitude toward emotions. Emotions, he says, are ugly 
and unpleasant. What are human emotions like? The Xunzi says: 
Man's emotions are very unlovely things indeed! 
What need is there to ask any further? Once a man 
acquires a wife and children, he no longer treats 
his parents as a filial son should. Once he 
succeeds in satisfying his cravings and desires, he 
neglects his duty to his friends. Once he has won a 
105 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 4 6. 
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high position and a good stipend, 
serve his sovereign with a loyal 
emotions, man's emotions--they are 
things indeed! 106 
he ceases to 
heart . Man ' s 
very unlovely 
Emotions run counter to things like filial piety, duty and 
loyalty. Virtues, like following the rites and filial piety, 
are beneficial and necessary to a well ordered society, as in 
the Mencius. Emotions, nevertheless, do not guide human beings 
to perform these acts. Moral actions are contrary to our 
emotions and our nature. Emotions lead people to act in self 
destructive ways. Xunzi says: 
The nature of man is such that he is born with a 
fondness for profit .... He is born with feelings of 
envy and hate, and if he indulges in these, they 
will lead him into violence and crime, all sense of 
loyalty and good faith will disappear. Man is born 
with the desires of the eyes and ears, with a 
fondness for beautiful sights and sounds. If he 
indulges in these, they will lead him into license 
and wantonness, and all ritual principles and 
correct forms will be lost. Hence, any man who 
follows his nature and indulges in his emotions 
will inevitably become involved in wrangling and 
strife, will violate the forms and rules of 
society, and will end as a criminal. 100 
Human beings, according to Xunzi, are born with feelings and 
desires. If we indulge in them they will lead us to commit 
acts of violence and crime and to violate the forms and rules 
of society. Where emotions cause disarray, rules and forms 
make for a structured, harmonious society. This differs 
106 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p. 168. 
100 Ibid., p. 157. 
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greatly from the Zhuangzi where emotions are identified with 
the forms and rules of society and the destruction of the 
natural order in which peace and harmony already exist. 1~ 
Emotions in the Xunzi are innate and make up our original 
nature. They are our constant nature. This can be seen in the 
following: 
Man's nature is evil; goodness is the result of 
conscious activity. The nature of man is such that 
he is born with a fondness for profit .... He is born 
with feelings of envy and hate .•. 109 
Human nature is selfish because we are born with desires and 
feelings of envy and hate. "The likes and dislikes, delights 
and angers, griefs and joys of the nature are called 
emotions." 110 Emotions, then, like hate, envy, joy, sadness, 
and anger characterize our nature. Emotions are qualities 
inherent in human beings at birth, they are natural rather 
than externally imposed as in the Zhuangzi. Human beings, in 
108 The Zhuangzi claims that the joy and happiness 
expressed in smiles and in the beaming looks of benevolence 
and righteousness are deceptive and misleading. "So the 
crouchings and bendings of rites and music, the smiles and the 
beaming looks of benevolence and righteousness, which are 
intended to comfort the hearts of the world, in fact destroy 
their constant naturalness." Emotions or the institutions of 
society do not pacify or comfort people as Mencius and Xunzi 
would have us believe, rather they serve destroy our tranquil 
and placid existence. Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang 
Tzu, p. 100. 
109 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p.157. 
110 Ibid., p. 139. I translated this passage earlier in 
the text in the following way: "The xing' s liking, hatred, 
joy, anger, sadness and delight are called qing." 
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the Xunzi, are born with an emotional nature. 
Emotions like anger and hatred, however, are only the 
initial qualities available to human beings at birth, they, 
through rites and music, can be altered, so that human nature 
can become "good." As Xunzi says: 
A warped piece of wood must wait until it has been 
laid against the straightening board, steamed, and 
forced into a shape before it can become straight; 
a piece of blunt metal must wait until it has been 
wetted on a grindstone before it can become sharp. 
Similarly, since man's nature is evil, it must wait 
for the instructions of a teacher before it can 
become upright, and for the guidance of ritual 
principles before it can become orderly. 111 
Just as a piece of wood must be steamed and forced into shape 
before it can become straight and, therefore, useful, human 
nature must and taught and guided before it can become 
orderly. Human nature has two levels of meaning in Xunzi. On 
the first level, it refers to what is inborn, our emotional 
nature that motivates us to behave in selfish ways. On the 
second level, it refers to the moral nature that can be 
reached by education and ritual principles. 
Human nature ought be permanently altered so that it can 
become proper and moral. Xunzi says: 
In ancient times the sage kings realized that man's 
nature is evil, and that he therefore inclines 
toward evil and violence and is not upright or 
orderly. Accordingly they created ritual principles 
and laid down certain regulations in order to 
reform man's emotional nature and make it upright, 
m Ibid., pp. 157-158. 
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in order to train and transform it and guide it in 
the proper channels. 112 
Our emotional nature is reformed by the rites created by the 
sage kings in ancient times. The li, train, convert, and 
direct our emotions so as to avert conflict between our own 
interests and our obligations to others. Once the emotions are 
refined through the rites they are no longer unlovely 
things . 113 The rites, as Munro says, "mould natural 
predispositions into socially acceptable forms by introducing 
control into all acts." 114 They bring order and harmony to 
the world and to the individual. 
Through rites Heaven and earth J01n in harmony, the 
sun and moon shine, the four seasons proceed in 
order, the stars and constellations march, the 
rivers flow, and all things flourish; men's likes 
and dislikes are regulated and their joys and hates 
are made appropriate .... In the world those who obey 
the dictates of ritual will achieve order; those 
who turn against them will suffer disorder. Those 
who obey them will win safety; those who turn 
against them will court danger. Those who obey them 
will be preserved; those who turn against them will 
be lost. 115 
The li dictate the order of all things, from the relationship 
between heaven and earth to moderating the joys and dislikes 
112 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p. 158. 
113 In an earlier quotation Xunzi describes emotions as 
unlovely things because they interfere with relationships 
between people in different positions. 
114 Munro, The Co nee pt; of Man in Ear 1 y China, p. 2 6 . 
115 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p. 94. 
70 
of human beings. Emotions are not qualities to be discarded as 
in the Zhuangzi, they are qualities that are innate in human 
beings that must be controlled by conventions such as li. 
Xunzi, in complete contrast to Zhuangzi, maintains that 
human nature must be controlled by conventions. Without 
conventions our emotions would not regulated; they would be 
out of control and, therefore, open to irrational impulses 
such our desires for profit an~ gain. Emotions, in the 
Zhuangzi, are bad in themselves, whereas in Xunzi, it is 
emotions without channels for prop~r expression that are seen 
as immoral. Emotions are viewed negatively, in the Zhuangzi, 
because they not thought to be a part of what is natural in 
human beings. They, like music and rites, are thought to be 
conventions of humanity that carve our inborn nature and 
consequently destroy the inherent order or process of the Dao. 
Xunzi argues that convention makes the most what is inborn 
where Zhuangzi argues that convention destroys it. 
It is the sage, in Xunzi, who uses convention to help 
other develop their natures. "The sage," he says, "stands in 
the same relation to ritual principle as the potter to the 
things he molds and produces." 116 Th e function of the sage is 
to mould our emotional nature by ~pplying musical forms and 
ritual principles to it. The sage is able to perform a 
116 Ibid. I p. 164. 
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teaching role because he is not directed by emotions. "The 
sage follows his desires, satisfies his emotions, and at the 
same time is restrained because he possesses reason." 1n The 
sage has emotions and he does express them because, through 
reason, he is able to maintain a tight reign on them. The 
rites, according to Xunzi, are the result of conscious 
activity. In others words the sage limits his emotional 
expression through ritual, which originated through reason. 
The sage, 
... does not allow himself to be influenced by 
considerations of desire and hate, beginning or 
end, distance or nearness, breadth or shallowness, 
past or present, but searches and examines all 
things and weighs them impartially in a balance. 118 
Emotions and desires, in Xunzi, are contrasted with reason. 
The person who is not influenced by his passions is able to 
view things in an unbiased manner. In fact the sage is 
distinguished from the average person because he is not 
directed by feelings such as love and hate. The sage is 
honoured for his impartially whereas the criminal is hated 
because he indulges in his passions. 
The reason people despise Chieh, Robber Chih, or 
the petty man is that they give free reign to their 
nature, follow their emotions, and are content to 
indulge their passions, so that their conduct is 
117 Ibid. I p. 133. 
118 Ibid. I p. 12 6. 
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marked by greed and contentiousness. 119 
The unreasonable person is one who is subject to his nature, 
his emotions and passions guide his actions that are greedy 
and quarrelsome. Both the sage and the criminal have emotions, 
but where the criminal is under their influence the sage is 
not. The sage simply judges whether or not an emotion is 
appropriate or if he can fulfil his desires within the 
precepts of ritual principles. 
Xunzi's concept of the ideal person is quite different 
from Zhuangzi's. Xunzi, like Zhuangzi, depicts the sage as 
impartial and open, but this is where the similarity ends. 
Xunzi's perfected person has emotions and acts in order to 
teach others how to control their emotional nature. Zhuangzi 's 
sage has no emotions, she has discarded the things that 
people, like Xunzi's ideal person, try to establish. 
Zhuangzi's sage throws away what is convention and seeks what 
is natural whereas Xunzi 's regulates natural, uninhibited 
emotion by imposing convention upon it. 
Zhuangzi's view of emotions is quite distinct from the 
Confucian thought of his age. Emotions, in the Zhuangzi, are 
not natural and are alien to his concepts of xing and xin. 
Emotions are adornments of nature that were externally 
imposed. They are not natural as Mencius and Xunzi supposes. 
119 Ibid., p.l65. 
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The sage, in Zhuangzi, is representative of the natural human 
being; he has a nature that is simple and uncomplicated and 
that is free of emotion and passion. The sage stands in direct 
contrast to the ordinary person who is guided by his or her 
emotions and who is consequently susceptible to harm and 
chaos. Emotions, in Mencius and Xunzi, though evaluated in 
different ways, were seen as characteristic of people in 
general. Emotions, in both Confucian texts, are regarded as 
part of our inborn nature. The emotional nature of the sage 
differed from the ordinary person because their emotional 
natures were cultivated: for Mencius this is done by 
nourishing one's innate sensitivity, that is, the four seeds; 
in Xunzi, by directing and controlling the expression of 
emotion through the rites and music. Zhuangzi•s ideal is a 
natural person without emotion, Mencius and Xunzi's in 
contrast, is a conventional individual, whose emotions, when 
regulated and nourished by cultural precepts like li and jen, 
produce a moral being. 
SUMMATION 
In the Zhuangzi, the ideal person is a person without 
emotions. The sage discards convention and returns to her 
natural self. She is plain and uncomplicated and follows along 
with the natural world; she takes care of her basic needs, and 
remains aloof from her environment. The sage has no emotions, 
and, therefore, has no feelings about right and wrong, no 
feelings of benevolence and righteousness. She does not feel 
sadness at the loss of anyone around her, she lacks fear in 
the face of danger and, although she may associate with 
others, she does not derive pleasure or pain from that 
association. She neither feels, nor generates, feelings of 
good humour, cheerfulness, or love. The sage is xuanjie, free 
from the emotional ties surrounding interpersonal 
relationships and as well, emotional turmoil in the world. 
When we looked at the etymology and use of qing, emotions 
primarily in the Mencius, the Zhuangzi, and the Xunzi, I 
demonstrated that qing was being used as an "umbrella" term 
for specific emotions like joy and grief. By examining 
passages from the Mencius, the Zhuangzi, and the Xunzi where 
qing and emotional states, such as joy and grief, were 
addressed their various approaches to emotion became apparent. 
Discussions of emotions often contained implicit assumptions 
about what an emotion was. We saw that emotions, in these 
texts, were often tied to judgements, desires, actions, and 
physical responses. Xunzi differed in one specific way; he 
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argued that emotions were natural impulses that did not 
involve cognitive thought. Zhuangzi's definitions of emotions 
are not unique, but remarkably similar to Mencius' and 
Xunzi's. 
As well, we encountered Zhuangzi 's negative attitude 
toward emotions. Emotions, he argued, had no place in the 
natural world and that they were constituents of the 
imperfect, 
perfected 
ordinary person instead of the truly natural, 
one. Emotions were aspects that were externally 
imposed instead of initial conditions defining us at birth. I 
emphasised this unusual view of emotions by comparing it with 
that of Mencius and Xunzi, other Warring States philosophers. 
Zhuangzi, as we have seen, maintains that emotions are 
foreign to us: tpey are not a part of the natural make-up of 
human beings. We have also seen that definitions of emotions 
are often tied to judgements, actions, desires, and physical 
expressions. Zhuangzi clearly distrusts all of them. He 
regards judgements, apart from emotions, as relative and 
narrow because they project only a partial reality. 
Judgements, evaluations, or beliefs based on either "this" or 
"that," acceptability or unacceptability, and right and wrong 
are biased, subjective, and incomplete. Judgements are based 
on how we see the world at a particular moment. The sage does 
not make judgements or evaluations, rather, she, like a 
mirror, reflects what is happening around her and responds to 
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it impartially. 
Action, that is, self-directed action, is, according to 
the Zhuangzi, contrary to the spontaneous, impartial action 
of the Dao. Zhuangzi asks: 
What is this thing called the Way? There is the Way 
of Heaven, and the way of man. To rest in inaction, 
and to command respect--this is the Way of Heaven. 
To engage in action and become entangled in it--
this is the way of man ... The Way of Heaven and the 
way of man are far apart. 120 
People who act with purpose and for their own self-fulfilment 
act in a manner contrary to the Way. Human beings act in order 
to force structure, values, and order on society. By forcing 
convention on what is natural we inevitably create strife: 
The Way cannot be brought to light; its virtue 
cannot be forced to come. But benevolence--you can 
put that into practice; you can discourse on 
righteousness, you can dupe one another with rites. 
So it is said, When the Way was lost, then there 
was virtue; when virtue. was lost, then there was 
benevolence; when benevolence was lost, then there 
was righteousness; when righteousness was lost, 
then there was rites. Rites are the frills of the 
Way and forerunners of disorder . 121 
The Dao is non-intentional and without desire, the opposite 
of egotistical effort. When egotistical action is carried out, 
it leads to benevolence and righteousness, which in due course 
creates disorder. The natural human being acts by wu-wei, non-
ego action, she does not interfere with the workings of 
120 Ibid. I p. 12 5. 
121 Ibid. I p. 235. 
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nature. 
We have also seen that emotions are connected to desires. 
Desires, according to Zhuangzi, are not part of natural order. 
In an age of perfect virtue, people are not led by their 
individual needs and desires: 
In this age of Perfect Virtue men live the same as 
birds and beasts, group themselves side by side 
with the ten thousand things ...• Dull and unwitting, 
they have no desire; this is called uncarved 
simplicity. In uncarved simplicity the people 
attain their true natures . 122 
When people have no preoccupation with themselves, they live 
in harmony with the ten thousand things. Desires are forces 
that activate us to pursue our own interests; they are 
manifest into ego-action, which is antithetical to the Dao. 
Similarly, those who have no emotions, understand the 
Dao, and do not oppose it, lack physical expression. We have 
seen Zhuangzi describe these people as people who, 
... pay no attention to .proper behaviour, disregard 
their personal appearance and, without so much as 
changing the expressions on their faces, sing in 
the very presence of the corpse! 1n 
Perfected people are incapable of feelings like grief, 
therefore, there is nothing to be reflected in their 
expression. 
We have also looked at Zhuangzi's analyses of xing and 
122 Ibid. I p. 105. 
m Ibid., p. 86. 
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xin and how they fit into his rejection of emotion. The sage 
is one who has regained her inborn nature and made her mind 
impartial and objective. She is without feelings, judgements, 
desires and self-directed action. The sage's way of life is 
one of simplicity, tranquillity, spontaneity and non-action. 
Qualities such as emotion, and the features of emotion, are 
typical of one whose nature is adorned, of one who has lost 
his natural state and now lives within the confines of society 
and its institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
After examining Zhuangzi' s views, one feels some sympathy 
for some of what he says, but also that he has gone too far. 
This reaction likely comes from our Western ideas of emotion 
and what it is to be a person. 
In Western thought we tend to devalue emotion by 
contrasting it with reason. Descartes, for example, says 
emotions are "animal spirits," hence, an inferior part of the 
mind. Leibnitz refers to them as "confused perceptions. " 124 
Reason is used to talk about actions that are sensible, sane, 
and socially acceptable. We therefore praise people who are 
unemotional because they are calm and composed. Emotions, in 
contrast, are seen as wild and chaotic. We talk about them as 
involuntary states that are uncontrollable. We use phrases 
like "helplessly in love," "being swept way by our emotions," 
"exploding in anger," or "falling apart with grief." Emotions 
are reactive states that occur spontaneously; they are not 
intentional. They lead us to make erroneous judgements that 
lead to irrational actions: emotions are natural, internal 
states that are not organized by cognitive, rational thought. 125 
We also disparage emotions as subjective and biased. 
Emotions distort our judgements and as a consequence, they 
cause "both a failure of perception and potential social 
124 Solomon, "On Emotions as Judgements," p. 183. 
125 Many of these ideas on Western attitudes of emotion 
are taken from Lutz's Unnatural Emotion, pp. 55-70. 
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disruption. As bias pushes individuals to pursue goals that 
accord only with their own views, the emotional\subjective 
person may thwart the attainment of a more global, social, 
objectively determined, and valid goals."u6 
However, emotions are also the source of individual 
energy. They can be the forces that motivate us to act. 
Morality, according to Lutz, requires emotion because it 
provides the motivation for taking particular moral positions. 
Morality derives from the feelings that make up the inner 
self. 127 In the West, we often think of emotions as the 
motivational force behind morality; this is Mencius' view as 
well. Emotions, he says, lead to a compassionate and righteous 
life, contrary to Zhuangzi's view. This is evident in the 
story of the child who almost fell into the well. The person 
who saves the child is motivated by his compassionate reaction 
to the child's possible suffering. According to Mencius, we 
are born with an innate sensitivity to others that leads us to 
act in compassionate ways. We are born with feelings of 
compassion, shame, respect, and with feelings of right and 
wrong. If we do not nourish these emotions we will be more 
like animals than humans. Mencius argues that to lose one's 
emotional nature is to be less than human. Though Xunzi does 
126 Lutz, Unnat:ural Emot:ion, p. 70. 
127 b ·a 8 I ~ . I p. 0. 
81 
not look at emotions in such a favourable light, he does say 
that our nature consists of emotions like joy and hatred. 
Emotions are what make us human. Whether they are rational or 
irrational, they are part of the definition of human beings. 
While morality may have emotional motivation, when 
emotions are associated with self-indulgence, then morality is 
seen as the means of controlling them. Catherine Lutz says, 
"[T)o the extent that morality is culturally defined as self-
control in the interest of a higher good, emotion's culturally 
defined self-indulgence is antithetical to it. " 128 Xunzi 
argues that the sage kings created morality in order to 
restrain us from pursuing all of our desires and fulfilling 
all of our emotional needs. 
In the West, emotions are seen as irrational and chaotic, 
but are also used to talk about the self and what is 
meaningful. In this sense, they define who we are. In both 
Western and Confucian views, emotions are also thought to make 
us human. 
Thus, there are limits to our belittling of emotion. 
Emotion is thought to be an important feature of interpersonal 
engagement. We describe people who are unemotional as "cold 
blooded" because we see them as lacking empathy and 
compassion. As Jeffrey Trimm points out, "[F) residential 
128 Lutz, Unnatural Emotion, p. 76. 
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candidates, for example, are not supposed to cry in public but 
neither are they expected to respond with cool legalism at 
questions about the hypothetical rape of a family member. Thus 
emotion, in a more valued guise forms a second polarity over 
against estrangement. " 129 In Western thought, emotion is 
perceived as making us both human and humane. Without them we 
are like the fictional Mr. Spock, detached and estranged. 
Thus, Zhuangzi 's position that the perfected person lacks 
emotions would mean that she has no sense of what we would 
call a self. Emotions are intimately tied to our sense of 
individuality; they make up our personal views, beliefs and 
values. As Ronald De Sousa argues, "[T)hey frame, transform 
and make sense of our perceptions, thoughts and 
activities. " 130 Emotions are projections of our inner selves, 
they define who we are, hence, our personality is dependant 
upon them. If Zhuangzi 's perfected person lacks emotions, 
then, we can say that she exists without any sense of 
individuality. 
The idea that the sage lacks a personality because she 
is unaffected by emotion is strengthened when we see that she 
is non-judgemental, spontaneous in her actions, and is not 
129 Jeffrey R. Trimm, "The Celebration of Emotion: 
Vallabha's Ontology of Affective Experience" Philosophy East 
and West 41.1 {1991}, p. 62. 
130 Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions 
{Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), p.3. 
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self-seeking. Unlike the sage, we make judgements based upon 
our observations and individual experiences. For example, I 
may dislike Joe because of behaviour that I find offensive. 
This kind of judgement is relative to my point of view and, 
because it is a projection of my inner feelings, it goes 
toward making up, or reflecting, part of my personality. 
Judgements lead me to actions that reflect what I believe. 
Joe's behaviour may make me so angry that I act by hitting 
him. My action is a response to my judgement. In essence then, 
who we are is partly defined by our finite views. Not only are 
our judgements projections of our inner selves, they 
constitute our desires and actions. When we judge something to 
be desirable, we engage in a series of manoeuvres that will 
lead to fulfi~ment. Judgements, and their corresponding 
desires and actions, belong to the domain of the individual. 
They, therefore, constitute a major part of an individual's 
personality. 
catherine Lutz argues, "[I]ndividuals are sacred only 
insofar as each of them "owns" his or her particular and 
distinct set of emotions."131 Emotions and feelings are 
intimately private matters. How we feel can only be known to 
us, others can only guess what we actually feel by observing 
our facial expression, body language, or through conversation. 
131 Lutz, Unnatural Emotion, p. 7 2. 
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Emotions, opinions, and values are totally subjective. 132 
Emotions, in the West, are essential to personality and self-
identity. 
Zhuangzi shares some of our views of emotion. Emotions, 
in the Zhuangzi, as in the West, are thought to be irrational. 
This can be seen in the anecdote where Chang Wuzi said to Qu 
Quezi 
How do I know that loving life is not a delusion? 
How do I know that in hating death I am not like a 
man who, having left home in his youth, has not 
forgotten his way back? 
Lady Li was the daughter of the border guard of Ai. 
When she was first taken captive and brought to the 
state of Chin, she wept until her tears drenched 
the collar of her robe. But later, when she went to 
live in the palace of the ruler, shared his couch 
with him, and ate the delicious meats of his table, 
she wondered why she had ever wept. How do I know 
that the dead do not wonder why they ever longed 
for life?133 
Emotions come from our lack of knowledge of the unknown. There 
is no true reason to love life and hate death, just as Lady Li 
had no reason, according to Zhuangzi, to weep when she was 
taken captive. She need not have feared the unknown because it 
turned out to be pleasurable and satisfying. Zhuangzi 
ridicules an emotion such as hating death because we do not 
know what death really is. 
Furthermore, emotions leave us susceptible to emotional 
132 Ibid. I p. 71. 
133 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 4 7. 
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upheaval. Zhuangzi, as we have seen earlier, says that to be 
unaffected by emotion is to be xuanjie, free of the bound, 
free from the vulnerability of being "helplessly in love," 
free from the grief we feel at the death of a loved one, and 
in essence, free from the sway of emotion. Emotions disrupt 
our qi, that is, our personal energy and harmony. When we are 
dispassionate we are not vulnerable nor subject to the many 
agitations felt by the passionate person. When we are xuanjie 
we "cease to be the plaything of circumstances and enjoy calm 
and contentment. " 134 Thus, while Western thinkers often 
contrast reason and emotion, Zhuangzi contrasts a spontaneous 
tranquillity with emotional upheaval. 
Both Zhuangzi and Western thinkers argue that emotions 
are not based in fact and they are subjective. They are biased 
and dependant on individual interpretation and point of view. 
Emotions are responses to our individual thoughts and 
attitudes instead of the whole situation. They are based on 
judgements and beliefs that, for Zhuangzi, are finite. In his 
view, emotions are the source of ego-action. They become the 
primary motivational forces within human beings when we lose 
our inborn nature. Our self-seeking tendencies are evident in 
our readiness to pursue our own interests and to satisfy our 
134 Joel Marks, "Emotion East and West: Introduction To a 
Comparative Philosophy" Philosophy East and West 41.1 1991), 
p. 2 0 
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desires and emotional needs. 
Zhuangzi goes further in his critique of emotions as 
subjective and biased. People, Zhuangzi says, carry out 
charitable actions because they enlarge their self-worth. 
These selfish tendencies cause wrangling, strife, disorder and 
personal harm. Acts of charity cause disorder for ages to 
come. The idea that self-directed action causes conflict can 
be seen in the story of Yan Hui and Confucius: Confucius, 
acting as a Daoist here, advises Yan Hui on his upcoming trip 
to Wei, where he plans to advise the ruler, 
Do you know what it is that destroys virtue, and 
where wisdom comes from? Virtue is destroyed by 
fame, and wisdom comes out of wrangling. Fame is 
something to beat people down with, and wisdom is a 
device for wrangling. Both are evil weapons ... if 
you do not understand men's minds, but instead 
appear before a tyrant and force him to listen to 
sermons on benevolence and righteousness, measures 
and standards--this is simply using other men's bad 
points to parade your own excellence. You will be 
called a plaguer of others. He who plagues others 
will be plagued in turn. You will probably be 
plagued by this man. 135 
Fame and wisdom are tools used by people to achieve their own 
desires. Yan Hui's concern about the subjects of Wei leads him 
to believe he is judicious and therefore in a position to 
advise the ruler. His actions serve to increase his perception 
of his prominence and will probably get him killed. Purposeful 
actions, such as entering political debates and arguing the 
135 b 'd I~., p.55. 
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merits of benevolence can only lead to personal harm. People 
can achieve longevity by spontaneous, not intentional, action. 
Zhuangzi parts company from Western views when he argues 
that emotions are not natural to us, but are part of an 
artificial self. There are several passages in the Zhuangzi 
that suggest that the sage, a truly natural human being, has 
no self: "Therefore I say, the Perfect Man has no self (ji); 
the Holy Man has no merit; the sage has no fame. " 136 
Zhuangzi' s ideal human being does not perceive an "I." In 
another passage, Yan Cheng Ziyou asks Ziji: "Can you really 
make the body like a withered tree and the mind like dead 
ashes?" Ziji says: 
You do well to ask the question, Yan. Now I have 
lost myself (wo). Do you understand that? You hear 
the piping of men, but you haven't heard the piping 
of earth. Or if you've heard the piping of earth, 
you haven It heard the piping of Heaven! 11137 
Ziji can make himself like a withered tree because he makes no 
distinctions between himself and the tree. He makes no 
subject/object distinction because his mind, like dead ashes, 
is empty and vacuous. This is difficult for an ordinary person 
like Yan to understand because he does not understand the 
underlying unity in all things. His ego has a finite 
understanding of itself and of nature. He is like the morning 
136 Ibid. , p. 3 2. 
137 Ibid. , p. 3 6. 
88 
mushroom who knows nothing of twilight and dawn or the summer 
cicada who knows nothing of spring and autumn. The sage, who 
transcends · all finite views, makes no distinctions between 
self and other. Lacking a concept of self, she, therefore, has 
no feelings, viewpoints, desires, and does not act in a manner 
that contradicts the Dao. 
Zhuangzi's notion that human beings ought to lack emotion 
fits into his overall philosophy. His attitude toward emotions 
and their corresponding constituents--judgement, action, and 
desire--is consistent. Emotions, and Zhuangzi's implied 
assumptions of what an emotion is, are depicted as qualities 
that are unnatural and foreign in the ideal world. 
Individuality is dependent on qualities like emotions, 
judgements, and self-directed actions. Without these 
qualities, humans beings return to their original state and 
become one with the myriad things. 
According to Zhuangzi, emotions belong to the domain of 
the artificial self rather than to the natural human being. 
Feelings characterize the self, they make evaluations of the 
world based on a particular time and place embedded in an 
individual's perspective. Zhuangzi does not value an 
individual personality in human beings because it is defined 
by emotion, which is based on finite view. The status of 
emotions in the West are, at times, precarious because they 
oppose the "rational" self and may cause senseless, irrational 
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behaviour; emotions in the Zhuangzi are problematic because 
they make up the self. The self, in Zhuangzi, is associated 
with limited understanding, and with self-serving and 
aggressive behaviour. 
Zhuangzi would also disagree with the idea that the 
emotions can move us to moral and compassionate actions. 
According to Zhuangzi, the sage, the natural human being, is 
not motivated by emotions because she does not find it 
necessary to act in a manner which best serves humanity. She, 
like the Dao, acts spontaneously, and not in accordance with 
an individual perspective. While individual action attends a 
problem from a point of view and from a particular time frame, 
the sage's spontaneity attends the whole because her actions 
derive from Heaven not herself . 138 In Graham's words, the sage 
"is as fluid as water which is unimpeded because it adapts to 
the contours of the ground; his response is as immediate as 
the echo to the sound. " 139 The sage's mind is like a mirror 
and does not need to judge or evaluate because her response is 
reflexive. "The sage," as Graham argues, "can dispense with 
moral imperatives because he has disciplined himself not to 
let local reactions distract him from attending to whole 
138 Graham, "Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of "Is" 
and "Ought,"" p. 16. 
139 Ibid. I p. 10. 
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situation. " 140 The sage, then, does not need emotion to 
motivate her to act in positive ways, she simply does what is 
necessary by wu-wei. Zhuangzi would point out, however, that 
while morality might try, it does not always restrain human 
behaviour. Morality, he argues, creates disputes over what is 
right and wrong because the question of what is moral is 
relative to time, place, and point of view. Principles, such 
as righteousness, are shaped by our social and cultural 
backgrounds. In other words, morality is subjective and biased 
just as emotions are. Furthermore, not only is morality 
relative, it is superficial and completely unnecessary. If 
human beings regained their inborn nature, they would be 
unaffected by emotion. Consequently, morality would not exist 
because its existence is necessitated by the presence of 
selfish, erratic, and irrational behaviour that stems from 
emotionality. The sage, therefore, can dispense with moral 
imperatives because there is nothing in her nature that 
requires restraint. 
It should also be mentioned in passing that, while 
Zhuangzi argues that emotions have no place in human life, he 
is not above evoking emotional responses to get our attention 
and influence our thoughts in the direction he wants. The 
sage, who has no passion, is portrayed in colourful and 
140 b 'd I~., p. 10. 
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dynamic ways. "The Perfect Man is godlike. Though the great 
swamps blaze, they cannot burn him .... A man like this rides 
the clouds and mist, straddles the sun and moon, and wanders 
beyond the four seas! " 141 Throughout the Zhuangzi, there are 
descriptions of the sage who can accomplish amazing feats. The 
sage is godlike, Zhuangzi argues, because she lacks emotion. 
Nevertheless, why is the sage, who is impartial, portrayed 
with such flair? Is Zhuangzi trying to evoke an emotional 
response? 
However, we may take issue with Zhuangzi in two areas: 
first, his rejection of compassion and, second, his argument 
that human beings are naturally without emotion. 
Zhuangzi would argue that compassionate actions make us 
feel good about ourselves, and elevate our self-worth and 
pride, leaving us with false impressions of our self-
importance. It can lead us to believe we know what is right 
and force that view upon others. This creates disputes between 
people and leads individuals to pursue their own "right" 
paths. Zhuangzi says these things cause chaos for years to 
come. We may argue that emotions do not always lead people to 
act in inconsiderate ways. Acts of charity include our concern 
for another's well being. This kind of action benefits both 
the community and the individual. How then, can they cause 
141 Watson, The Complete Works of Zhuangzi, p. 46. 
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problems for ages to come as Zhuangzi maintains? 
The more basic issue, however, is whether or not emotions 
are natural to human beings. Is his ideal of a naturally 
unemotional human being possible or even desirable? Can we 
live without emotion? 
Zhuangzi, as we have seen earlier, believes that it is 
natural for human beings to band together, but that it is 
unnatural for us to be affected by emotion. 142 We unite with 
others, but do not form relationships based on emotion. We are 
not distinguished from other creatures because we can reason, 
our nature is simply to plough and weave; the constants that 
make up human nature are no different from those that make up 
animals. Throughout the Zhuangzi, simplicity is continually 
stressed. Imbedded in the text is an underlying argument that 
we should discard culture and its conventions and return to 
the simplicity that was prevalent in early human communities. 
It is unlikely we can achieve this ideal. Through 
anthropology, we know that even the smallest hunting and 
gathering groups form social groups that involved people 
working together to hunt and gather food. Their survival was 
based on cohesive family units. But, the lives of these people 
were enriched by emotion in ritual, as well in interpersonal 
relationships based upon love, humour, joy and so on. 
142 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 7 5. 
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Relationships, even those based upon mutual need, produce 
emotion. Emotions, like love, follow from joint tasks of 
mutual need, nurturing, and parenting; negative emotions, like 
resentment, result from competing with others. It seems 
unlikely, then, that human beings can band together without 
developing feelings for one another. 
It is difficult to picture even an isolated individual 
who would be devoid of emotions. In order for life to have 
meaning and value there must be emotions. What value could one 
find in a life devoid of love? A dispassionate life would lead 
to alienation and estrangement. 
So a problem with Zhuangzi lies in his argument that 
human beings are naturally without emotion. He says this 
because he thinks that human beings should model themselves on 
the Dao. Since the Dao has no emotions, neither, properly, 
should human beings. However, this may be an error. Perhaps 
what it is to be human is to be a creature with emotions. 
A further problem with Zhuangzi's position is that he 
tells us to rid ourselves of emotion as we discard the 
artificial self. But, is this possible? Once emotions are 
evoked (whether they are natural or learned), can they be 
discarded or can they only be repressed? One wonders at the 
cost that repression. 
Although there is an underlying rationale to Zhuangzi's 
notion of the perfected person, as one who lacks emotion and 
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personality, it is an untenable goal because whether we are 
isolated or in a group, it seems more likely that emotions are 
innate. Emotions make sense of our thoughts and beliefs, and 
enhance and give meaning to our lives. Although emotions may 
generate emotional upheaval and chaos, they seem to be natural 
to us. 
I noted earlier that, while the West contrasts reason and 
emotion, Zhuangzi contrasts spontaneous tranquillity and 
emotional upheaval. Zhuangzi 's critique of emotion tends to be 
a critique of only certain emotions, such as anger, fear, and 
greed, and of the attitudes they lead to. One is left with an 
uneasy sense that his rejection of emotion is itself based on 
fear. Fear of entanglement with the world and fear of the 
uglier emotions. Had he given us a thorough critique of love 
or friendship, for example, we might find it easier to agree 
with his argument. 
In the West emotions are both valued and disparaged. 
Emotions are what make us human. Individuality is dependent 
upon the existence of emotions: they make up our opinions, 
values, beliefs and so on. As well, they motivate us to be 
compassionate and caring. Yet, at the same time, we see 
emotions as irrational, subjective, biased and selfish, 
generating discord within individuals and society. 
In the Zhuangzi, emotions are portrayed in negative ways 
because they are subjective and selfish and because they make 
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us unique. Individuality is made up of finite points of view 
and actions that are ultimately self-directed and self-
concerned. If emotions are what make us human, and individual, 
then, according to the Zhuangzi, we are condemned to 
irrationality, bias, and selfishness. Harmony cannot exist 
when emotions make us who and what we are. 
The way in which emotions and individualism are depicted 
fits into the overall philosophy of the Zhuangzi. It is not 
reasonable to assert, however, that we ought to strive to 
become emotionless. Emotions enhance and give meaning to our 
lives and without them we become alienated and flat. Zhuangzi 
is not convincing when he says that human nature is naturally 
without emotions. Zhuangzi's view of emotions is best depicted 
in his own terms. In one of his anecdotes, Zhuangzi talks 
about a frog that claims it has a clear and undivided view of 
the sky. In reality, the frog can see only a small part of it 
from the bottom of the well. His understanding, therefore, is 
biased and incomplete. Zhuangzi is like the frog he portrays. 
He grasps the bias and self-seeking tendencies involved in 
emotions and individuality, but he fails satisfactorily to 
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